Iraq Surge Fail Update

As the government paralysis continues, Jihadists try to foment more sectarian war by attacking two Shiite shrines, aiming at Iranian religious tourists. They’re obviously trying to repeat their Samarra Mosque moment. Here’s hoping they don’t succeed. But how the current political situation in Iraq manages to prevent these Sunni extremist provocations – without prompting even … Continue reading Iraq Surge Fail Update

Iraq Surge Fail Update

BAGHDAD2010SabahArar:AFP:Getty

The Wikileaks doc-dump adds more light to debunking the myth of the surge. No one doubts that Petraeus' extra troops and shrewd bribery played a part in reducing sectarian violence of nightmarish levels. But the further we get away from that moment in time and the more we learn, the clearer it is that it was the internal dynamic of Iraq that created the lull:

A unique set of conditions had coalesced on the ground. The warring communities were exhausted from the frenzy of killing. Mixed neighborhoods and cities were largely cleansed. The militias, both Sunni and Shiite, long seen as defenders of their communities, had begun to cannibalize them, making local residents newly receptive to American overtures.

Civil wars have their own ghastly rhythms; and the war we pretended to control we never controlled. And we still don't. The violence was dropping fast before the surge was in place:

The single worst month for civilian deaths was December 2006, two months before the buildup’s first brigade arrived. Casualties dropped slightly in January. In February, when the first new brigade arrived, the recorded casualties dropped by a quarter, though it is the shortest month. Around that time, Moktada al-Sadr, the anti-American cleric, decamped to Iran, perhaps fearing American troops. What the documents suggest strongly is that Iraqis themselves were looking for an escape from the orgy of sectarian killing made worse by the growth of ordinary, but still violent, crime.

There's no doubt that the US military were admirably able to take advantage of these internal dynamics. But the narrative that official Washington has tried to perpetrate – that the war was "ended" by more US troops – is simply untrue. The war was burning itself out before more troops arrived; the surge failed to use this lull to construct a multi-sectarian democratic government (which was its own criterion for success); the current forces pit a Sadr-Maliki Shiite government against increasingly alienated Sunnis now re-aligning with al Qaeda, and possibly also against the Kurds in the north, where tensions are rising again and could easily spiral into a civil war as US troops leave.

What Petraeus achieved was a face-saving withdrawal. That was all.

Iraq Surge Fail Update, Ctd

Tom Ricks is unsurprised by the news:

 More evidence, I would say, that the surge worked tactically (that is, improved security and so enabled Uncle Sam to edge toward the exits) but failed strategically (that is, didn't lead to a breakthrough in Iraqi politics). I think the big question is how far the Sunni Awakening reversal will go. Is this the beginning of the next phase of the war? I dunno. And how much will U.S. troops be involved? Again, an open question. I am hearing through the grapevine that things are getting friskier. 

Yglesias echoes:

Iraq Surge Fail Update

  AWAKENINGATTACKKhalilAlMurshidi:AFP:Getty

Surprise!

Although there are no firm figures, security and political officials say hundreds of the well-disciplined [Awakening] fighters — many of whom have gained extensive knowledge about the American military — appear to have rejoined Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Beyond that, officials say that even many of the fighters still on the Iraqi government payroll, possibly thousands of them, covertly aid the insurgency. The defections have been driven in part by frustration with the Shiite-led government, which Awakening members say is intent on destroying them, as well as by pressure from Al Qaeda….

During the past four months, the atmosphere has become particularly charged as the Awakening members find themselves squeezed between Iraqi security forces, who have arrested hundreds of current and former members accused of acts of recent terrorism, and Al Qaeda’s brutal recruitment techniques.

From my Sunday Times column two weeks ago (now paywalled):

If I were a Sunni who had risked his life to fight al Qaeda in Anbar at the behest of the Americans, I would be asking myself at this point: for what? For the triumphant victory of one of the more virulently anti-Sunni forces around – the Sadrites? …

There is still a chance that Maliki will try to coax some Sunnis into government. But to form an easy majority, all he needs now are the Kurdish parties to form a government with no effective Sunni representation at all. If that were to happen, the chances of Sunni alienation – with the revival of al Qaeda in Anbar – are very high.

Iraq Surge Fail Update

Surprise! Al Qaeda is alive and well and rapidly gaining strength in Iraq: Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia’s structure has given it the flexibility to make frequent and varied attacks, analysts say. “You don’t need a huge, thriving organization to carry out huge, devastating attacks,” said Matthew Levitt, director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and … Continue reading Iraq Surge Fail Update