Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence vs Texas is, as usual, interesting and not quite as chock-full of animus toward homosexual dignity as in the past. It comes down to two arguments: that an assertion of “morality” is justification enough for any law anywhere, regardless of its rationality; and that a law that covers only same-sex sodomy is not discriminatory toward homosexuals. Both ideas strike me as wrong. On the first count, surely the government does need to provide some kind of reasonable justification for a law expressing “morality,” which doesn’t just rely on what people have always believed or always assumed. One reason that this law was struck down is because its supporters couldn’t come up with an argument that justified persecution of private sexual behavior, apart from the notion that stigmatizing gay sex was somehow good for families. Allowing sodomy for 97 percent of the population, while barring it for 3 percent cannot possibly be defended as a law designed to prevent or deter the immorality of sodomy. It was a law entirely constructed to stigmatize gay people. It had no other conceivable prupose. And when “morality” is simply a rubric under which to persecute a minority, then we don’t really have the imposition of morality at all. We have the imposition of a prejudice. At least the Catholic Church makes no distinction between heterosexual sodomy and homosexual sodomy. In fact, I know of no religious or moral tradition which makes the distinction that Texas law made until today. Scalia is not upholding any morality. He’s upholding prejudice. As to his notion that the law doesn’t single out gays because two straight guys getting it on would be criminalized as well, that’s like saying that a law banning Jewish religious services is not anti-Jewish since goyim could not conduct such services either. It’s the kind of sophistry you need to deny the obvious, hostile intent of the Texas law.
SCALIA’S INSIGHT: But he’s right about one thing. Once you acknowledge the dignity of gays as a social class, once you have conceded that their private sexual and emotional lives cannot be reduced to a single sexual act, once you have made the law equal with respect to the private sex lives of heteros and homos, the logic of same-sex marriage becomes hard to resist:
This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Justice O’Connor seeks to preserve them by the conclusory statement that “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is a legitimate state interest. But preserving the traditional institution of marriage is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples.
Of course, that precise moral disapproval of same-sex couples – not sex acts, mind you, but couples – is precisely the “morality” that Scalia purports to uphold. It isn’t a reasonable morality, since it allows the “sin” of sodomy for the vast majority of people but denies it only to people who have no non-sodomitic option in their sex lives. It’s a system of social stigmatization that has its own circular, prejudiced rationale. But getting rid of that incoherent prejudice does make marriage the obvious next step:
Today’s opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” for pruposes of proscribing that conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense at neutrality) “when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring”; what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising “the liberty protected under the Constitution”? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, sinnce the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry. This case “does not involve” the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of the Court.
Precisely. Equality under the law means something. And now, it inescapably means the right to marry – for all citizens and not just those with power.