Al-Qaeda militants have taken over the Anbar province cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, prompting a campaign by the military to win them back. Ariel Zirulnick explains how the group’s resurgence is linked to the Syrian civil war:
Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni Arab and the toppling of Saddam Hussein began a process in which their community has felt more and more politically and economically marginalized relative to the country’s majority Shiite Arab community. While that process of disenfranchisement paused briefly towards the end of the US occupation of the country, when a US military strategy of outreach to Sunni Arab tribes with promises of jobs and a seat at the political table paid huge dividends, Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has persistently antagonized Sunni Arab politicians and citizens alike since the US military’s departure at the end of 2011.
Many of the Sunni Arabs of Anbar now view Maliki much as they did Iraq’s interim American rulers and with a civil war in Syria raging next door, the local Al Qaeda franchise is finding the wind at its back once more. The Islamic State in Iraq, which incorporated many Syrian jihadi fighters during the battle against US forces, formally merged with Al Qaeda supporters in Syria last year to form the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also commonly referred to as ISIS) which has become one of the most powerful groups fighting against the Syrian regime. The cross-border movement is far from supported by all in Anbar – its heavy-handed treatment of citizens of towns it controls and contempt for the local culture, tradition and tribal notables saw to that – but the number of people willing to join up, and almost as importantly willing to turn a blind eye rather than informing the authorities about militant movements, has swelled.
Frud Bezhan looks at how the crisis unfolded and what it might portend:
According to Kamran Karadaghi, a London-based Iraqi political commentator and former chief of staff to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, much of the current fighting is a result of the longstanding political crisis in Iraq. ‘The political establishment has failed to reconcile with the Sunnis,’ he says. ‘The Sunnis are almost completely sidelined. The Sunni provinces of Iraq, especially Anbar, were once staunch opponents of federalism but now they want federalism for themselves. That shows you to what extent they’re dissatisfied.’ Tensions spiked in Anbar after Sunni lawmaker Ahmed al-Alwani was arrested in Ramadi on December 28, reportedly on terrorism charges. Days later, on December 30, Iraqi security forces broke up a yearlong sit-in being staged by Sunni protesters who complained of being marginalized by the Shi’ite-led authorities and unfairly targeted by security forces. The crackdown triggered clashes between the military and local tribesmen. The dismantling of the Sunni protest camp also prompted 44 lawmakers, many of them Sunnis, to submit their resignations. Protests against the government first broke out in Sunni areas of western and central Iraq in late 2012 and have continued for more than a year.
The ongoing fighting could have significant implications. Domestically, the violence will deepen tensions between the government and minority Sunnis. Karadaghi believes this could bring Iraq to the brink of civil war and lead to the country’s disintegration along sectarian lines. ‘The violence will only deepen the crisis in Iraq,’ he says. ‘Without a real and genuine reconciliation and political solution, the situation will escalate and become worse and worse. It might turn into a real Sunni-Shi’ite confrontation.’
Looking at these and other recent events, Daniel Byman pronounces 2013 “the year we lost Iraq”:
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has seemingly returned from the dead. On the verge of strategic defeat as U.S. forces departed Iraq, AQI has since regrouped into a large and growing force, contributing to the surge in violence in Iraq and the broader region. Although the neighboring conflict in Syria partially drives AQI’s resurgence, the causes of the group’s comeback are much deeper. Domestically, the weakness of the Iraqi state – and thus the ability of small, violent groups to operate with considerable freedom – has been a persistent problem since the fall of Saddam’s regime. Politically, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki made progress in restoring faith in Iraq’s institutions and establishing order in 2008-2009. However, in recent years he has focused on consolidating power and, in so doing, has alienated Iraq’s Sunni Muslim community. Iraqi security services are now more brutal, more political, and less skilled than they were when U.S. forces departed Iraq in 2011. As the Sunnis became marginalized, AQI’s popularity again grew. Iraq’s neighbors contribute to the problem, sending money and volunteers directly to AQI or indirectly to the organization to support its role in the Syrian conflict. As the violence spreads, it has taken on its own dynamic. Iraqis trust the security services less, and more Sunnis support AQI for revenge or because of a perceived need for self-defense from the Shi’a-dominated security services or associated militias. This in turn leads the regime and the Shi’a community to view the Sunnis with even more suspicion and in their eyes justifies greater regime repression. Unfortunately, none of these problems are abating, and several are getting worse. So AQI’s power is likely to grow.
(Video: Raw footage of fighting in Anbar province from the Associated Press.)
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