Chait believes the “clean” vote in the House yesterday marks the end of an era:
We have probably seen the last, final gasp of debt ceiling extortion. In 2011, Republicans used the threat of default to pry unrequited spending cuts from Obama. Then Obama wised up and refused to pay any more ransoms. Republicans tried to go through the drama twice more — last winter, when they settled for “making” Senate Democrats pass a budget, which they planned to do anyway. And then last fall, when they combined their debt ceiling hostage demands with a government shutdown. This time, Republicans tried halfheartedly to attach the debt limit to some kind of popular change Democrats wanted, but didn’t even bother threatening not to lift the debt ceiling if they failed.
Now we can go back to regular gridlock.
Allahpundit’s not so sure:
Is this the end of Republican debt-ceiling brinksmanship, once and for all? In theory, the leadership might feel bolder next year after the midterms have passed; in practice, there’s simply no reason to believe that Boehner or McConnell will ever allow Treasury to hit the ceiling. They’ll always swallow hard and let Democrats pass a clean debt-limit hike instead. Better to abandon this method of negotiation than keep farking that chicken with phony standoffs whose outcome is a fait accompli.
Greg Sargent credits the Democrats for avoiding another crisis:
The crucial point about this outcome . . . is that it will be the direct result of the decision by Dems — in the last two debt limit fights — to refuse to negotiate with Republicans.
That was a major course correction on Obama’s part in which he learned in office from failure. After getting badly burned in the 2011 debt limit showdown — which left us saddled with the austerity that continues to hold back the recovery — Obama recognized what many of his supporters were pleading with him for years to recognize: There was no way to enter into a conventional negotiation with House Republicans.
Ed O’Keefe counts the “no” votes:
There were several notable Republican “no” votes, including the fourth-ranking Republican, Conference Chairman Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.), House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), Rep. Lynn Jenkins (R-Kan.), a leadership lieutenant, and Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.), a close Boehner ally. Rep. Tom Latham (R-Iowa), another retiring member and close friend of Boehner, was absent Tuesday and didn’t vote.
Democrats, meanwhile, demonstrated incredible unity. Just two members — Reps. John Barrow (D-Ga.) and Jim Matheson (D-Utah) voted no. Initially, Rep. Mike McIntyre (D-N.C.), a moderate who is retiring, also voted no, but eventually switched his vote. Barrow faces the most difficult reelection race of any Democrat this year, while Matheson is also retiring but expected to someday seek statewide office.
Benen wonders why the House Republicans picked this fight “knowing in advance failure was inevitable”:
Not to put too fine a point on this, but it’s generally the job of the Speaker of the House to steer clear of legislative icebergs. Boehner has a responsibility to see the challenges ahead and lead his chamber towards a responsible course. If he had the influence and leadership skills generally associated with House Speakers, Boehner never would have allowed this misguided hostage gambit to begin in the first place.
But the Speaker allowed it to unfold anyway, and both he and his party ended up with nothing to show for it except another round of public humiliation.
But, as Weigel recalls, Boehner never wanted this fight:
Really, he didn’t—though he saw it coming. At the end of 2010, as it became clear that Republicans would run the House of Representatives, people started to wonder whether the new members would agree to raise the debt limit. Boehner, in a December 2010 interview with The New Yorker, acknowledged that they’d have to. “For people who’ve never been in politics it’s going to be one of those growing moments,” he said. “It’s going to be difficult, I’m certainly well aware of that. But we’ll have to find a way to help educate members and help people understand the serious problem that would exist if we didn’t do it.”
The Tea Party PACs are already demanding the speaker’s head:
“A clean debt ceiling is a complete capitulation on the Speaker’s part and demonstrates that he has lost the ability to lead the House of Representatives, let alone his own party. Speaker Boehner has failed in his duty to represent the people and as a result, it is time for him to go… Fire the Speaker,” said Tea Party Patriots co-founder Jenny Beth Martin in a statement before the vote. The statement linked to a petition to “Fire the Speaker,” and the group’s Twitter account has been tweeting since the vote asking people to call Boehner and tell him to “resign.”
For Bernstein, this episode illustrates how little power the Tea Partiers have in the legislature:
The truth is that the Tea Party votes in the House have never been relevant to any must-pass legislation. After all, the real radical position is to oppose raising the debt limit regardless of what’s attached, and in the long run the radicals were never going to vote for whatever final deal emerged, even if it gave them some of what they wanted. See, for example, the Budget Control Act in 2011, which failed to win the votes of 66 Tea Party-leaning House Republicans.
The lesson of the shutdown for both moderates and mainstream conservatives in the House (and something they should have realized before the shutdown) was that many of them eventually were going to have to split from the radicals because, at the end of the day, something would have to pass, and they (along with Senate Democrats and President Barack Obama) would have to go along with it.
Kilgore thinks this chain of events reflects poorly on Boehner:
Boehner’s many defenders in the MSM will probably say he went through this doomed exercise in order to teach his troops a lesson, and/or to give conservatives every opportunity to come up with a workable debt limit formula. But when a party leader can’t be sure of getting 10% of his conference to back him on critical legislation, the “lesson” would seem to be that the leader just ain’t leading any more.
Chris Cillizza sums it up:
This, as has become clear over the past year or so, is Boehner’s fate as Speaker: To lead a group of Republicans who do not want to be led.
The Dish 