Mohammad Ballout examines the effect that ISIS’s blitzkrieg in Iraq is having on the war in Syria:
The results of the “Mosul invasion” will soon change the nature of the battle in the battlefields between the “jihadist” brothers in the Syrian east.
If Mosul is not recovered, ISIS may find more than it needs of land, financial resources and human resources to revive the “rule of the caliphate in Badiyat al-Sham.” Controlling Mosul has doubled ISIS’ ability to recruit thousands of fighters from the new Iraqi human reservoir, after annexing the large Ninevah province. All that depends on tribal alliances stretching from Anbar to Deir ez-Zour. And there are inexhaustible oil resources. The Turkish market will buy looted Syrian oil at the cheapest price across the Tell Abyad crossing, taking advantage of the European Union’s decision to facilitate the sale of Syrian oil to finance the opposition.
On the other hand, Fabrice Balanche considers the rise of ISIS a boon for the Assad regime:
Bashar al-Assad is clearly on the path to victory by way of continuing gains since Qusayr in June 2013. From the spring of 2013, the Syrian army, helped by Hezbollah, has been retaking territories: the southern suburbs of Damascus, the Qalamoun, and most recently, the center of Homs. The Syrian regime is not only massively supported by Iran and Russia (something the insurgency lacks), but Assad also applies a highly effective strategy of counterinsurgency. The rise of Islamists against him provided the ideology that Bashar al-Assad needed, i.e. the fight against Islamist terrorists supported from abroad. By demonstrating his resoluteness, Bashar al-Assad wants to reassure his supporters and win over the silent majority. The latter no longer seek the return of peace, but are falling into line behind the force that can ensure their security and is most likely to win.
But that second “S” in ISIS doesn’t really stand for “Syria” the country, but rather for “al-Sham”, i.e., “greater Syria” or the Levant (hence the alternate acronym ISIL). Dexter Filkins illustrates the conflict’s regional dimension:
The extremist groups dominating the fighting are beginning to take their war beyond the two countries that they now freely traverse. In January, isis carried out a car-bomb attack in Beirut near the offices of Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group that has been fighting on behalf of Assad. The Nusra front has also carried out attacks in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the number of Syrian refugees who have fled to that nation exceeds twenty per cent of its population, which is not something that a state as weak and as fractious as Lebanon can be expected to sustain. In Jordan, the presence of half a million Syrian refugees is putting an enormous strain on the fragile monarchy.
Taylor Luck reports on ISIS’s plans for Jordan:
Islamist sources claim that the Islamic State is preparing for “expansion into Jordan” as it continues to push westward through Iraq. According to jihadist sources close to ISIL, the former Al Qaeda affiliate opened on Friday an “unofficial” office and branch in Jordan to usher what sources claim as expansion of the Islamic “caliphate”.
Despite having a low-profile presence in Jordan over the past six months, with over 800 Jordanian nationals reportedly serving under the ranks of ISIL, the movement has allegedly been reluctant to open an official branch in Jordan due to its ongoing rivalry with Al Qaeda, which retains larger popularity and support among hard-line Islamists in the country. Senior members of Jordan’s hard-line Salafist movement, which keep strong ties with both Al Qaeda and the Baghdad-based ISIL, had previously mediated “understandings” with the Islamic State to forego expansion into the country in a bid to prevent ongoing jihadist civil war in Syria to spill over into the country.
The Dish 