The Definition Of IS Is …

Apparently it’s just “the Islamic State” now, not “ISIS”:

IS announced Sunday it was establishing a “caliphate” — an Islamic form of government last seen under the Ottoman Empire — extending now from Aleppo in northern Syria to Diyala province in eastern Iraq, the regions where it has fought against the regimes in power. In an audio recording distributed online, the group declared its chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi “the caliph” and “leader for Muslims everywhere”. Henceforth, the group said, he is to be known as “Caliph Ibrahim” — a reference to his real name.

Though the move may not have immediate significant impact on the ground, it is an indicator of the group’s confidence and marks a move against Al-Qaeda — from which it broke away — in particular, analysts say. The caliphate is “the biggest development in international jihad since September 11”, said Charles Lister of the Brookings Institution in Doha, referring to the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States in 2001.

J.M. Berger reads into this lofty declaration:

The pronouncement of the caliphate is sure to be wildly controversial on religious grounds, but ultimately it could cut either way.

The backlash may harden the pro-AQ segment of the global jihadist movement against ISIS, especially with the announcement’s flat-out demand that all other jihadist groups are religiously obligated to pledge loyalty to ISIS. But it will also generate some enthusiasm from foot soldiers and different segments of the global movement that see ISIS as a rising star. …

On the other hand, Muslims worldwide are likely, on the whole, to react negatively to the pronouncement. The question here is how many currently nonviolent radicals will jump toward ISIS and how many will jump away from it. Again, this is a high-risk, high-reward scenario for ISIS. It could reap considerable benefits, but the backlash could be severe.

Juan Cole ridicules the announcement, pointing out that the abolition of the caliphate 90 years ago has meant precisely nothing to the vast majority of the world’s Muslims, who aren’t likely to care any more for “Caliph Ibrahim” than for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi:

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood developed the institution of the Supreme Guide, which under President Muhammad Morsi in 2012-2013 developed theocratic aspirations. The Supreme Guide, Muhammad Badie, proved conspiratorial and controlling, and Morsi proved compliant. The vast majority of Egyptians were annoyed by this grandiosity, and they overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government. Badie is in danger of being executed. I think that the Egyptian elite has gone too far in persecuting Muslim Brothers and branding them terrorists, mind you, and the death sentence on Badie is a human rights violation. But I’m just pointing out that calling yourself Supreme Guide and getting the loyalty of a sectarian group is no guarantee of worldly success. And the Brotherhood is way more important the the ‘Islamic State.’

This Baghdadi ‘caliphate’ thing is doomed, as well.

Morrissey is also dismissive, but he sees a strategic purpose:

At any rate, the declaration of the caliphate has less to do with statehood or global leadership than it does with local competitors. Zawahiri may get annoyed, but he’s not really the main target of this declaration. It’s meant to warn competing militias in the areas ISIS already controls that either they’re with Baghdadi, or they’re against him. ISIS wants no competition in arms inside of their existing footprint or adjacent to it, and will target any other networks that don’t fall in line. That’s where the infighting will occur.

Charles Lister, on the other hand, thinks it’s a pretty big deal:

The impact of this announcement will be global as al-Qaida affiliates and independent jihadist groups must now definitively choose to support and join the Islamic State or to oppose it. The Islamic State’s announcement made it clear that it would perceive any group that failed to pledge allegiance an enemy of Islam. Already, this new Islamic State has received statements of support and opposition from jihadist factions in Syria – this period of judgment is extremely important and will likely continue for some time to come. …

Geographically, ISIS is already fully operational in Iraq and Syria; it has a covert presence in southern Turkey, appears to be establishing a small presence in Lebanon; and has supporters in Jordan, Gaza, the Sinai, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. This could well be the birth of a totally new era of transnational jihadism.