No, Don’t Ally With Assad

The Syrian president isn’t as strong as he claims to be, Liz Sly remarks, and he needs us far more than we need him:

After three years of fighting, the army is depleted and tired. Assad is indebted to local militias trained and funded by Iran, and to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, for his government’s most important victories. Many of the Iraqi Shiite militias who also helped have gone home to fight the Sunni extremists on their own turf. The government sustains its efforts to repress the rebellion by bombing communities that oppose it from afar, further fueling the grievances that enabled extremism to thrive.

Even if the United States wanted to partner with Assad to defeat the extremists, “it’s not clear what he would bring to the table,” said Jeff White of the Washington Institute of Near East [Policy]. “What we’re seeing is the overall, uneven degradation of the regular military forces,” he said. “They’re becoming less and less capable over time.” That is partly why Syria is so eager to join forces with America in the international coalition President Obama is seeking to build against the Islamic State

He’s also been known to screw over his partners:

There has long been a clear pattern to Syrian statecraft: Syria’s leaders accommodate their opponents just enough to keep them at bay without ever surrendering the ability to do harm to the same said opponents.  It is smart and it has proven successful, which makes one wonder why anyone would ever believe that they could get something done with the Assads.

Examples of Syrian duplicity in which Damascus is discreetly helpful in one area, but causes trouble—most often death and destruction—in another abound.  Where to start?  How about the entire occupation of Lebanon?  Syrian forces put an end to the Lebanese civil war, but this was hardly a function of altruism.  Lebanon has paid a steep price and will continue to pay for Syria’s occupation for generations.  Then there is the way in which the Syrians have scrupulously maintained the armistice on the Golan Heights, but nevertheless enabled Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.  Of course, Hezbollah was a response to Israel’s invasion and occupation of Lebanon, but it was also through the group that the Syrians sought to inflict pain on the Israelis, spilling mostly Lebanese blood in the process.