I should say up-front that I’ve learned a lot from reading Ross’s and Larison’s challenges to my alleged connection between disorienting economic and social change and the rise of religious fundamentalism. I also learned a lot from the latest Teixeira/Abramowitz study on the working poor and the Democrats. I think the evidence does indeed complicate my previous inferences and connections. What have I gotten wrong? Fundamentalism obviously appeals to the wealthy as well as the poor; it may even, in certain circumstances, appeal more to the wealthy than the poor (I haven’t denied that, but my emphasis has obscured it). And it has done very well in prosperous suburbia and among more educated white voters. The question is whether a sense of economic and cultural alienation has fueled fundamentalism as well. I still think it does, but less powerfully than I did before. On abortion, for example, Teixeira notes the GOP has had more success in appealing to upper-middle class whites than to working class ones. That’s an important insight. But it remains true nonetheless, as Teixeira also notes, that the working class white vote is still more pro-life than the middle class white vote (43 percent to 33 percent).