“Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seat at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.” – Winston Churchill, “My Early Life,” 1930.
SHOULD IT BE A ‘WAR’?: British historian Michael Howard gave a penetrating speech yesterday warning of the dangers of this war. His critique deserves serious thought. His is a criticism that doesn’t come from defeatism or leftist relativism. He wants us to win, and his critique is designed to facilitate that. Besides, his analysis of the broader context seems to me to be correct, i.e. “the huge crisis that has faced that vast and populous section of the world stretching from the Mahgreb through the Middle East and central Asia into South and South-East Asia and beyond to the Philippines: overpopulated, underdeveloped, being dragged headlong by the West into the post-modern age before they have come to terms with modernity. This is not a problem of poverty as against wealth, and I am afraid that it is symptomatic of our western materialism to suppose that it is. It is the far more profound and intractable confrontation between a theistic, land-based and traditional culture, in places little different from the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the secular material values of the Enlightenment.” Nicely put.
STILL A WAR: At the same time, I think Howard is wrong in asserting that the very denomination of this conflict as a ‘war’ is a mistake. He’s right to point out that al Qaeda and other fanatical sects gain some prestige by being named a formal enemy. But they had already gained that prestige by the stunning success of their brutal assault on America. Besides, they are also a de facto state, since the Taliban regime is essentially a client of the terrorists and indistinguishable from them. So ‘war’ is indeed the correct term for the first part of this campaign, and this war needs to be conducted with as much ferocity as possible against the Taliban regime. That regime must be destroyed; and al Qaeda’s nerve center must be obliterated. Perhaps in the second phase, such terminology can be relinquished – as the campaign goes beyond al Qaeda to terrorism in other states and entities. Howard’s judgment as to the qualities required for such a conflict seem to me to be right on: “secrecy, intelligence, political sagacity, quiet ruthlessness, covert actions that remain covert, above all infinite patience.” He is right too that “all these are forgotten or overridden in a media-stoked frenzy for immediate results, and nagging complaints if they do not get them.” But that is where we are in Afghanistan, and the best response is to wage a full war now, and transform it into a calmer, but just as ruthless campaign thereafter.
A VIRAL ANALOGY: I know it’s subjective, but I can’t help relating this struggle to the battle against HIV. At first we longed for a “cure,” and there was no breakthrough. Many experienced anger as the deaths mounted and the enemy seemed elusive. The first avenues of attack ran aground. But gradually, as our learning curve soared upward, and as anger turned to grief-stricken patience and iron resolution, progress was made. Even now, though, there is no absolute victory. The virus has not been defeated. It still exists in every single living person who was once infected with HIV. Infection cannot be reversed or undone. But success is measured by how powerfully it has been repressed, and by the ability of people with HIV to live as normal lives as possible. This is perhaps a model for countering terrorism in the long run. By eschewing the chimera of a cure, we can advance the possibility of a real treatment. And if the treatment is effective enough, it amounts, in the fallible world we live in, to a cure by any other name.
The Dish 