AFTER THE MARCHES

Several things are worth noting after the weekend’s spasm of outrage and protest at the thought of deposing Saddam with American and British arms. The first is that the NATO crisis seems to have eased. The second is that France has still not ruled out supporting the use of military force although Chirac is sailing very close to the German position. The third is that editorials in the New York Times and even the Guardian/Observer have reasserted the need to keep a military option on the table. I think some reason for this new-found sobriety is based on the weekend’s marches. There is little doubt that they represent something absolutely real in European public opinion: an aversion to any war for any cause except in urgent self-defense. But what, one is forced to ask, were these marches actually for? And if these people’s representatives were actually in power, how safe would we be?

THE ADOLESCENT MOMENT: The British march was a negative one: against conflict. But its positive goals were and are opaque: they range from Islamism to workers revolutionary socialism to pacifism to anti-Americanism. Lesbian avengers marched next to people who would stone them to death. None of the marches addressed an answer to the problem of what to do about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the premise of the marches was that there is no problem. Saddam is evil but harmless, they seem to say (although the avoidance of any mention of Saddam, in words or pictures, was the most stunning aspect of the spectacle). Or they think that the terrifying prospect of a Blixkrieg will cow Saddam into compliance. Very few concede that “inspections” are only happening at all because Bush and Blair played the military card and meant it. And few seem to understand that the threat of military force is useless if the premise is that it will never be exercised. Their marches this weekend, by making exactly that no-war-ever argument, paradoxically undermined the likelihood of a peaceful settlement being reached. Not that they seem to care.

SAVING BLAIR: When you think about it, this is the behavior of adolescents. Leaders, in contrast, have to take responsibility. No marcher will be held accountable if Lyons or Manchester or Chicago endures a dirty bomb, procured from Saddam. No protestor will be held responsible for a nerve gas attack on the London tube. But Bush and Blair will be. And they should be. That’s why, after this mother of all teenage tantrums, the grown-ups will have to reiterate the process, restart the inspections, redouble the threat, and, if necessary, launch the invasion. But this weekend changes one thing, I think. Blair may not survive politically if we go to war with no further attempt to bring the U.N. around, and the war is in any way complicated or prolonged. It makes no logical sense to go back to the U.N. But it makes a lot of political sense – if only to show the world American reluctance to go to war and to shore up an absolutely critical ally. (Imagine losing Blair to his party’s left-wing wolves at a critical moment in the military campaign.) Here’s one option: take Villepin’s date of March 14 and make it a final deadline. Say that by that date, Saddam must provide an accounting for the anthrax, nerve gas and other missing and unaccounted for materials cited by Blix; and also by that date, Iraq must destroy all its al Samoud missiles, which are banned under existing resolutions. We need a deadline. We had one – “immediate compliance” – I know. But we lose nothing by giving the world a final one. It would put the onus back on Saddam, help Blair, show a little flexibility on the part of the U.S., maybe bring around a few more Security Council members and not lose any significant time. Again, this isn’t logical from the point of view of 1441. But it is a reflection of the political pressures on a key U.S. ally. Recognizing that political pressure is not surrendering to it. But ignoring it when we can still offer an alternative would be foolish. We can afford to be a little flexible. So let’s be.