The Washington Post gets the real story this morning:
A senior diplomat from another council member said his government … was told not to anguish over whether to vote for war. “You are not going to decide whether there is war in Iraq or not,” the diplomat said U.S. officials told him. “That decision is ours, and we have already made it. It is already final. The only question now is whether the council will go along with it or not.”
That’s some brinkmanship. But I think it also happens to be true. The second U.N. resolution is irrelevant to whether a war actually takes place. It is therefore a gamble Bush cannot completely lose (whatever diplomatic and popular damage it does would be more than undone by a successful war). But it’s a resolution the Security Council (and France and Germany) can easily lose. If the resolution is defeated, but war ensues, Bush will take a small hit at home, a huge hit abroad (still, how much worse could it get?) – but, precisely because of these things, an even bigger domestic gain if the war is successful. Bush will be seen as someone who did all he could to win over the U.N., but in the end, did what he believed was right. He will emerge principled and triumphant. Ditto Blair, especially if a liberated Iraq reveals untold horrors, human rights abuses and French arms contracts. Machiavelli’s dictum applies powerfully now: all that matters is that Bush win the war. If he does, this conflict will be deemed to have been just and justified. That’s why calling the French bluff is especially important – particularly if it isn’t a bluff.
FRANCE’S PREDICAMENT: France, to my mind, has the most at stake. A failed resolution followed by war would mean the end of the United Nations as a credible world body, which, in turn, is largely the source of French global influence. The French certainly don’t have any serious global military power – and even the EU is beginning to wriggle out of their grasp. If an Iraq war is successful, the orneriness of the pro-American Eastern European countries will only increase, handing more leverage to Britain, Spain and Italy in a 25-nation EU. At this point, I’d say the main real pressure – despite what seems evident on the surface – is therefore on France (and to a lesser extent, Germany). They will wield their maximum power at the next Security Council vote. But the moment the vote is over, their fate will rest entirely on how well the U.S. and U.K. armed forces do in the Iraqi desert. I’m beginning to think Saddam knows this reality as well. Perhaps he has already assumed that war is inevitable and that there’s nothing he can do to stop it. That’s why he’s is indicating he won’t give up the al Samoud missiles to help his German and French allies win in the security council. He’ll need those missiles for more urgent tasks in a couple of weeks. His gambit now is therefore to do as much damage to his enemy as possible before his inevitable demise. That means diplomatic damage, by coaxing the anti-Americans, France and Germany, out of their post-cold-war closet, wrecking the U.N., and splitting NATO and the EU. And no doubt it will also mean the deployment of whatever chemical and biological weapons he may have – against allied soldiers and the “Zionist entity.” If I were the French president, I would therefore use Saddam’s refusal to destroy the al Samoud missile, if it occurs and isn’t just another ploy, as a way to climb down. Chirac’s point has been made. And then the war will happen. Whether Chirac likes it or not.
The Dish 