Yesterday, I suggested that in some ways, we’re headed backward toward the nineteenth century. This stimulating, long, essay by Lee Harris in TCS argues the opposite: that weapons of mass destruction together with fantasist Islamism or nihilist totalitarianism make our predicament completely and world-historically new. I wish I could see a way to rebut this theory easily, but I cannot. I’ve learned a lot from Robert Kaplan’s analysis of a complete security breakdown in whole parts of the globe; what I haven’t put together coherently in my own head – because I’m afraid to? – is what the combination of world anarchy and destructive technology could lead to. In the past, we conceived of the threat of warfare coming from rival states which had built up various means of economic and thereby military strength. But now we have the reality of completely weak states, or parasitic states, or failed states or neo-states (like al Qaeda) getting nukes by buying them, or stealing them or smuggling the component parts. They can also find ways to detonate them anonymously so that the civilized world is incapable of rational response or even rational deterrence. It seems to me that the chances of something like this happening are extremely high.
THE PRE-EMPTIVE OPTION: Which leaves us with very few good options. But the obvious one is pro-active pre-emption: going in and getting rid of such regimes and entities, destroying them, or occupying them. But doing so – invading terrorism-sponsoring states, before they have formally attacked us – violates the basic principles of the international order we have understandably come to cherish. So we have a profound – and new – conflict between security and sovereignty, between a catastrophe-free world and international law. You might be able to find a way to square this cricle if all the civilized countries in the world agreed about the nature of this new threat and exercized collective security against rogue states – but it would have to be collective security with one standard for the civilized world and one for everywhere else. Our current U.N. (which includes rogues states and makes no distinction between them and others) naturally doesn’t recognize such a double-standard. Moreover our civilized partners simply don’t believe that the threat is that grave. Even after 9/11, even many Americans don’t believe the threat is that serious. This is therefore the key context of our current impasse. Europeans simply don’t believe that we’re living in a radically more dangerous and unstable world. Or they think that mild measures can temporarily solve the problem – like porous and largely inneffective inspection regimes in Iraq. So we are at a deadlock. And if we cannot get consensus on Iraq – with umpteen U.N. resolutions and the precedent of a previous unprovoked war – what hope is there of getting consensus if Iran’s mullahs go nuclear? Or North Korea’s nut-case gets several nukes? Or someone else out there we have yet to hear from decides to go to heaven via a suitcase nuke in L.A.?
A DISMAL THOUGHT: I’m left with the conclusion that we will only get such a consensus in favor of pre-emption after the destruction of a major Western city, or a chemical or biological catastrophe. In this sense, Blair and Bush may simply be ahead of their time. And what they see as the potential threat is so depressing and terrifying that it’s perhaps only understandable that the world for a while will wish to look the other way. The truth is and we may as well admit it: we have failed to convince the world, just as Churchill failed to convince the world in the 1930s. And as 9/11 recedes a little, we are even tempted to falter in this dreadful analysis ourselves. The difference between now and the 1930s, of course, is that we may now have Churchill in office – but before the world has become convinced of his rectitude: history repeated as a deeply tragic farce.
STILL, SKEPTICISM: To add to the complications, we may be right about the basic analysis but wrong in this particular case. Perhaps North Korea is more potentially dangerous and therefore worthy of more immediate attention than Iraq. We live in an opaque world, however good our intelligence, however solid our leadership. I liked this point of Harris’s:
Once the world-historical magnitude of the risk is understood, it is possible for men of good will to differ profoundly over the wisdom of this or that particular response – and not only possible, but necessary. But this must be done in a climate free of pettiness and personalities: the cult of naxefve cynicism – that oxymoron that characterizes so much of what passes today for intellectual sophistication – must be dismantled and as soon as possible if we are to make our response as intelligent and as creative as it must and can be. To call prudence appeasement is wrong. But to call the United States’ response a bid for empire is simply silly.
I’m a little chastened by that criticism. Some on the far left and right are indeed appeasing, or even sympathizing with the enemy. Others on the near left are putting partisanship before strategic clarity. (Others on the left are fully clear-sighted about what is at stake.) But some criticism of our Iraq policy is well-intentioned and based not on denial but mere prudential disagreement. On balance, I think war against Saddam now is essential. In fact, in retrospect, I fear we may have lost a lot by not going to war unilaterally months ago. But the most important thing – and this is the main import of Harris’ essay – is to remember the new realities we’re all trying to make sense of. Just because they’re truly terrifying doesn’t mean we can safely try to forget them. And it is impossible to keep that context clear in our minds without also constantly remembering that day eighteen months ago. There really is a connection between 9/11 and Iraq – at the deepest and most meaningful level imaginable. We may endure more such days before we summon the will to do what we have to. Or we may have the luck and the leadership to prevent it. I’m praying for the latter.
The Dish 