Josh Marshall has a detailed rebuttal to my recent criticisms of his criticisms of the Iraqi campaign so far. Josh is easily the most credible liberal blogger, so let me take his counter-arguments one by one. (I don’t agree with Josh, by the way, that this kind of back-and-forth is insidery. We’re not discussing ourselves; we’re debating the issues. Isn’t that what opinion journalism should be all about?) I argued that the plan made sense in as much as we shot for the moon in trying to decapitate the regime quickly, but still have the resources to fight a less triumphant campaign. Josh counters:
If it were true that we were just shooting for the moon knowing that it might fail and that we’d then hit them with a more conventional infantry and armor attack, we’d already have our infantry and armor in place. We don’t. So I don’t find that argument particularly credible.
But from what I can tell, we do have our infantry in place. Moreover, our air superiority is helping destroy the Republican Guards before we encounter them on the ground. I see no evidence that we are holding back from Baghdad because we don’t have sufficient troops. I see evidence that we’re trying to avoid street-fighting, by luring the Saddam shock troops out into the open, while we pulverize them from the air, and get reinforcements from Kuwait. (According to the Washington Post this morning, the first real battle between the army and the Republican Guard is pitting 20,000 U.S. soldiers with 21st century armaments against 6,000 Saddamite troops, half of whom have no formal military training, and whose artillery has been pounded from the air for days.) Even Barry McCaffrey concedes that
“the 100,000 troops en route to the battle will give the operational commanders the ability to control the pace and tempo of the fight if we sense trouble.”
Like Josh, I’m not expert enough to tell whether we have enough troops for the job at hand. But Franks says we do; Pace says we do; the latest reports suggest we do; and even arch-skeptic McCaffrey says we soon will have. What difference does it make if we take Baghdad in four weeks rather than two?
LIBERATION: Josh’s second point is the following:
The administration premised virtually all of its strategy and most of its tactics on the assumption that the civilian population would treat us as liberators. Unfortunately, that basic assumption has been shown itself to be fundamentally flawed. Our military strategy was based on the idea that the Iraqis would be so happy we’d shown up that they wouldn’t harrass our supply lines on the way to Baghdad. That hasn’t panned out.
But ordinary Iraqis are not harrassing our supply lines. Paramilitary Saddam loyalists are. We did indeed under-estimate the legacy of 1991, and the power of a police state to intimidate people – and I’ve been more than candid about that. But, as Josh agrees, it’s still unclear what the general Iraqi population feels about our intervention. Which brings me to a different point. What if we’d done what Josh seems now to support: a massive 1991-style 500,000 troop, lumbering onslaught through the deserts? Wouldn’t that have looked much more like an invasion than the current action? And would that have been more useful in getting rid of fedayeen in street-fighting? I can see the Arab press now writing up the huge invasion force as a new imperialism; and a whole bunch of military commentators pointing out how the army was fighting the last war. I can also see the dangers in that approach of not being able to move quickly and deeply enough to secure the Western airbases (to protect Israel) and the oil-fields (critical for reconstruction). It seems to me that the flexible Franks-Rumsfeld plan was therefore a pretty good one. Perhaps the Turkish refusal to allow border-crossing from our troops hindered things a lot. All I can say is that this quibbling and second-guessing is based on an incredibly high standard for military success after less than two weeks of combat. No harm in that, I suppose. As long as we don’t let perfection become a means of under-appreciating something that’s perfectly good.
THE MOVING GOAL-POSTS: Then Josh shifts the goal posts for success even further. Here is the only scenario in which he will feel chagrined for his political pessimism about this war:
Presumably, I’ll be haunted one or two months from now when we’re off on an easy occupation of Baghdad, governing a peaceful nation of thankful Iraqis, and resting easier since we’ve cowed Syria, Iran and the Palestinians into quiescence.
Come on, Josh. I don’t think anyone has promised that. If, in two months, we have liberated Iraq from Saddam, brought its oil back on line, set up a new provisional government, and begun the process of de-Ba’athification, then I think most Americans will think of this war as huge success. And they should. The attempt to stem the rise of Islamist terrorist totalitarianism in the Middle East will take a generation at least. But it’s worth trying. The alternative is to sit back, watch it fester and wait for it to come at us with weapons of mass destruction. Some of what we’ll do won’t exactly endear us to the Arab world. But in the long run, we’re not looking for love; and the experience of fledgling semi-democracies in Jordan, Turkey and Iraq could well change many minds. That’s my hope. And it’s not a hopelessly quixotic one.