A very helpful discussion from Richard Perle in February of this year. I think it shows how the way in which the anti-war media have been using the term “imminent” is a grotesque over-simplification:
Let me say a word about what you call the new strategy of preemption. There’s nothing new about preemption. If you know that you are about to be attacked, it is certainly sensible if you can act first and avoid that attack to do so. I don’t think anybody would dispute that. So then the question is how imminent must the attack be to justify the preemptive response. Here, we need to think more carefully about the concept of imminence. In 1981, the Israelis, after a long and, I gather, a heated cabinet debate, decided to destroy the reactor that Chirac had sent to Osirak, not because it was about to produce nuclear weapons. It wasn’t. It was about to produce plutonium and it was under IAEA safeguards so the Iraqis would have had to siphon off small, undetectable quantities of plutonium and it would have taken them time to build a nuclear weapon based on what they would get from the Osirak reactor. But, nevertheless, the Israelis decided to strike some years in advance of the production of the nuclear weapon that they were concerned about.
Now, why did they do that? They did it because the Iraqis were about to load fuel into the reactor and once they did so, they would not have had an opportunity to use an air strike without doing a lot of unintended damage around the facility, because radioactive material would have been released into the atmosphere. So from an Israeli point of view, what was imminent and what had to be acted against in a preemptive manner was not the ultimate emergence of the threat but an event that would lead inexorably to the ultimate emergence of the threat. They had to deal with a threshold that once crossed, they would no longer have the military option that could be effective at that moment. If we think of imminence in that sense, if we think of it as the thresholds that once crossed will so worsen our situation that we can’t allow those thresholds to be crossed, then you start looking at how far are they from achieving the means to do the thing that everyone would recognize we were justified in stopping at the moment that action was taken. In the case of Iraq, we’re talking about stopping the further development of nuclear weapons, we’re talking about new systems of delivery for the chemical and biological weapons Saddam already has, including systems with much longer range. What is imminent about Iraq and what may be imminent in some other situations requires you to look back and decide when a threat becomes unmanageable.
So the administration did not regard the Iraqi threat as “imminent” in the usual sense of that word. as the NSC document had it, “As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats [America’s enemies and their pursuit of WMD] before they are fully formed.” That’s why Kay vindicates the Bushies. That’s why the opponents have to distort history so massively to get the spin they want. (For a full roster of how widely disseminated the lie was, click here. For the new anti-war meme, see this editorial in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune. Now the spin is that Bush may not have said “imminent threat,” may even have disowned the phrase, but he implied it. Nice try, guys. Hat-tip: blogger Chad.)