David Ignatius seems to be missing something about the debate over Rumsfeld’s future, calling him “a convenient scapegoat” for the administration’s mistakes in Iraq. But why, on the heels of an electoral victory that vindicated the president’s Iraq policy, would Republicans be trying to save face? For the victors, post-election recriminations are about the future rather than the past — and Rumsfeld is associated with a particular post-election agenda. As Bill Kristol, who initiated the anti-Rumsfeld movement, said of the secretary: “His theory about the military is at odds with the president’s geopolitical strategy. He wants this light, transformed military, but we’ve got to win a real war, which involves using a lot of troops and building a nation, and that’s at the core of the president’s strategy for rebuilding the Middle East.” As Ignatius sees it, the debate over troop levels “is partly a rear-action battle against Rumseld’s ideas about military ‘transformation.’ Advocates of the old, heavyweight Army have never forgiven Rummy for advocating lighter, more mobile forces, but Rumsfeld was correct.” Evidently, however, not everyone agrees. As Andrew put it:
Rumsfeld came into the Pentagon with an admirable agenda of forcing the military to become leaner, to maximise the use of technology and to move away from the large numbers and heavy armaments of the past. But his wars showed that the old methods were still valid.
So Rumsfeld’s critics “see a clear mismatch between America’s goals and its means” and “recognize in Rumsfeld an obstacle to victory rather than an asset.” Whatever the details regarding armor in Iraq, the fact remains that Rumsfeld favors air power and light forces rather than large numbers of armored troops. This leads, some argue, to American deployments unprepared for the security situation on the ground. But it also means an American military ill-equipped for political reconstruction and nation-building, the sort of democracy-promoting missions Rumsfeld doesn’t like. “Donald Rumsfeld has articulated a strategy of nation-building ‘lite,’ involving a rapid transition to local control and a tough-love policy that leaves locals to find their own way toward good government and democracy,” Francis Fukuyama has written. “This is a dubious approach, at least if one cares about the final outcome.” So it’s not surprising that those who want the U.S. to promote democracy or rebuild failing states would like a future administration Rumsfeld-free. And it also explains why Rumsfeld isn’t simply a scapegoat for the president: On nation-building and democracy, Bush and Rumsfeld disagree.
P.S. Matt Yglesias suggests that liberals might want to join what has been, until now, a debate among conservatives about the future of the military and U.S. foreign policy. Otherwise, they cede the issues to the right.
–Steven Menashi
The Dish 