It was useful to be reminded of why we’re there. The war was partly a defensive action against the possibility of Jihadists’ getting a hold of Saddam’s WMDs; it was partly finishing off a job that was started over a decade previously; and it was partly a deep, strategic response to 9/11, born from the belief that if we didn’t reverse decades of support for autocracy in the Middle East, we would get more 9/11s, and Iraq was as good a place as any to start. The president was right to reiterate all this. The speech was also important simply as a statement of resolve. Resolve matters in wartime and Bush’s obstinacy is an asset, not a liability, all things considered. Alas, when it came to explaining how our strategy in Iraq has worked, is working and will succeed, the speech was alarmingly short on persuasiveness. Around the edges of the president’s demeanor and rhetoric, I sensed a little panic. The speech had nothing – nothing – new, except an implicit rebuke to the unhinged bluster of Dick “last throes” Cheney. I do think that the following, however, was pretty striking:
To complete the mission, we will prevent al-Qaida and other foreign terrorists from turning Iraq into what Afghanistan was under the Taliban – a safe haven from which they could launch attacks on America and our friends. And the best way to complete the mission is to help Iraqis build a free nation that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.
The inference here is clear. The U.S. intervention, and its ill-planned, under-manned, haphazard execution, has made Iraq more of a terrorist threat than it might otherwise have been. I say “might,” because an eventually unconstrained Saddam could well have become such a menace. But the president here outlined the case of the war critics: that this war may have made matters worse; that Iraq could become another Taliban-Afghanistan; and that is now why we can’t afford to lose. I don’t believe that fully. I think that by 9/11, the threat was already too far gone to be deterred by half-measures. What dismays me is that the Iraq war has been such a “half-measure.” It was never conducted with the kind of massive force and meticulous planning that would have forestalled such a dangerous possibility. But, look, these are fights over the past. There is too much at stake to rehash them endlessly. What matters now is winning. And so let me suggest something concrete for those of us who want to win.
WHY CAN’T WE SEAL THE SYRIAN BORDER? That’s the essential question. It seems we have made some progress with the Sunni minority; it seems that a silent Iraqi majority wants a new democracy; it also seems that many of the worst suicide attacks are clearly coming from foreign Jihadists. Almost all these jihadists are coming from the Syrian border. It seems obvious that one of our principal tasks right now is therefore to secure that border. The question is: why can’t we? The answer is: we don’t have enough troops. But the president again reiterated the formual last night that he doesn’t set troop levels; and the commanders say we have enough. So we have to ask him again and again: if we have enough troops, why isn’t the border secure? How many extra troops would it take to secure it? These would not be occupying the country as such, and so wouldn’t fall into the category of prolonging the occupation. They would obviously be defending Iraq from foreign terrorists. Could a combination of such troops and surveillance technology drastically cut down the number of infiltrators? It seems clear we cannot afford to reposition troops in the country to the border, so where can we find the additional men? Wouldn’t this be an ideal task for the U.N., or for NATO or even for other Arab forces? Or could we find another 30,000 or so from elsewhere in the world? Instead of going round and round on the troop level question, let’s get specific and ask why the border cannot be sealed. We may even get a specific answer. I’m just trying to be constructive here.
The Dish 