WHOSE BOOM?

Unfortunately, I think Matt Yglesias is right, and this Fred Barnes column – on why most Americans aren’t more optimistic about the state of the economy – doesn’t do the work it sets out to do. Maybe there’s plenty of micro-level data showing that things are getting better for the average worker, and the Bush Administration just isn’t talking up the right data, but Barnes’s examples don’t prove that point:

Yet there’s a strong case Bush and his aides can make for impressive economic gains at the individual level. True, rising healthcare costs have cut into the gains, but tax reductions have helped. By citing micro numbers or fleshing out macro numbers, the administration would convey this message: it’s not just you who’s doing well. Most Americans are. The country is.

For instance, there’s the growth in per capita disposable personal income from $26,424 in 2003 to $27,001 in 2004 and $27,365 in 2005. That’s not all. In November, hourly wages were up 3.2 percent. And people are able to spend more. Real personal consumption spending has risen nearly 3 percent in the past year. True, these last two numbers are macro, but they’re ones people can understand.

But if the last two numbers are macro, then we’re left with only the growth in per capita disposable personal income to prove the micro-point – and any “per capita” number is easily skewed by large gains in the upper brackets that don’t necessarily extend to the median worker. Which is exactly what’s been happening of late, so far as I can tell – the well-off are getting better-off, and the median American income is stagnating. This isn’t disastrous news – as Matt notes, we’re a pretty rich country, and even with some stagnation our median income is the envy of most of the world. And the rich-getting-richer phenomenon isn’t necessarily the fault of George W. Bush or the GOP in general, as even Paul Krugman was obliged to admit recently. But it’s still something that Republicans need to grapple with more seriously than they have – because the trend is likely to continue, as globalization drive down wages for blue-collar workers while the premium for a college diploma goes up and up; and because a lot of those median-income Americans with stagnating incomes belong to the GOP’s base.

– posted by Ross

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

Julian raises an interesting point – is it even meaningful to talk about a “culture war” in the internet age, when the idea of a common mass culture seems as dead as Betamax? This was Terry Teachout’s point, too, in a recent Commentary essay that’s unfortunately in their for-pay archives (bastards!), but that I tried to summarize and respond to here. Essentially, Teachout’s thesis is that “the common culture of widely shared values and knowledge that once helped to unite Americans of all creeds, colors, and classes no longer exists,” and that instead “we now have a ‘balkanized’ group of subcultures whose members pursue their separate, unshared interests in an unprecedented variety of ways.”

I think this is true, up a point – nobody who’s wandered through Comcast’s 300-odd channels or wasted a day online would deny that American culture is in certain ways more fragmented than ever before. But I think there’s still something of a common culture, broadly construed – or more accurately, I think there are two cultures, one highbrow and one lowbrow, which interact in various ways but which are increasingly distinct from one another. These two common cultures aren’t necessarily defined in terms of a single television show that everyone watches, but each one has a set of shared values, assumptions, interests and habits – all of which may manifest themselves in a wide variety of shows and books and movies and websites, but which are held in “common” nonetheless. So for instance, one set of highbrow types might spend their spare time reading literary bloggers, while another set spends theirs downloading Arcade Fire or British Sea Power from iTunes. But both of these sets probably consider the New Yorker the last word in highbrow journalism, read the Sunday Times regularly, aspire to send their kids to elite universities, laugh along with Jon Stewart (even if they don’t watch The Daily Show every night) and so on and so forth. They don’t share all the same tastes, in other words, but they speak the same cultural language.

And this is even more true in the lowbrow realm, where people are more likely to have their tastes in music, film and books – and their attitudes and mores – shaped by an increasingly homogenized and consolidated culture industry. The front table at Barnes and Noble narrows the options for readers; the book tables at Wal-Mart even more so. Local radio stations are owned by national behemoths; the movie industry is dependent for its profits on 15 or 20 blockbuster movies every year; and there are 300 channels, sure – but the fact that one person watches “Extreme Makeover: Home Edition,” while another watches “Trading Spaces” and a third favors “Live with Regis and Kelly” doesn’t mean that they aren’t partaking of a common culture.

WHERE HAVE YOU GONE, REINHOLD NIEBUHR?: So, returning to the original question, what does this mean for Christianity? Simply, this: that America has a lowbrow culture that’s still pretty religious, but whose religiosity tends to be, well, lowbrow – a lowest-common-denominator mix of self-help spirituality and New Age mush. And the highbrow culture, meanwhile, isn’t religious at all: it’s not anti-religion, exactly, but it definitely considers religious belief an oddity and an anachronism, and orthodox Christian belief dangerously close to fanaticism. Which is one of the reasons that most religiosity in America is so lowbrow – because the highly intelligent people who might elevate the level of religious discourse have their faith leeched out of them by their immersion in the highbrow, in its assumptions and its prejudices. And the people who complain about this – about how we don’t have any more Reinhold Niebuhrs, and isn’t it a tragedy? – tend to be exactly the people who in an earlier era would have been the Niebuhrs, but who now partake of what Richard John Neuhaus once called “the pleasures of regretful unbelief.”

What we need, then – and by “we” I mean Christians, though I obviously think there would be benefits to non-Christians as well – is a more highbrow Christianity, and one that doesn’t prostrate itself on the altar of political correctness, as token highbrow Catholics like Garry Wills are wont to do. Perhaps “culture war” is the wrong word to use in this context, since we don’t necessarily need more Christians making the case against same-sex marriage, or pushing all their chips into the battle over courthouse displays in Alabama. We need more Christians writing good novels and essays and doctoral theses, and television shows and movies and music – all of which might inter alia make the case for a Christian understanding of, say, sexuality, but which would be primarily works of art and intellect and not polemics, creating a cultural space rather than just a political movement.

We can’t expect any favors: The doors of highbrow American culture have been closed against that sort of thing for decades now, and you can’t expect the New Yorker or the New York Times to just throw them open – why should they? They’re content with the world they’ve made, in which Philip Pullman is a hero, C.S. Lewis is a sad “prisoner” of his religious belief, science is always under assault from fundamentalism and monotheism is an easy whipping boy for all of history’s ills. Christians keep insisting that this world has it all wrong, of course, but it’s not enough to say it – we need to show them.

But there’s no reason to be discouraged – after all, we’ve done it before . . .

– posted by Ross

JELL-O WRESTLING WITH ROSS

Well, far be it from me to dissapoint Matt Yglesias if he’s looking for a catfight. I suggested that pushing for a more Christianized public sphere was a risky proposition, likely to dilute and secularize the shared symbols Christians prize. That, Ross ripostes, is a “counsel of despair,” and ultimately just evidence of the need to Christianize even harder. And that makes sense insofar as it goes—the risk of dilution presupposes that there’s a broader commercial and secular mass culture to do the diluting. If you could change mass culture wholesale, you’d avoid that problem. I don’t think that strategy is likely to succeed—and, from my perspective, so much the better—but it’s worth considering why.

The kind of deep change Ross is contemplating fairly requires the deployment of semiotically “thicker” stuff than a few creches or an “In God We Trust.” Their suitability for that sort of transformative work is limited by people’s ability to interpret them in a wide variety of ways. But if thin symbols are too blunt for the task at hand, thicker ones are likely to bump up against as much dissent from other Christians as from the secularist boogeymen. Consider Abington v. Schempp, one of the seminal Supreme Court cases on religion in school. Respondent Ed Schempp (who won on an 8-1 decision) wasn’t a wild-eyed atheist, but a Unitarian who objected to morning Bible readings in public schools on the grounds that he wanted his son exposed to scripture in the context of his own interpretations of it. As your buddies at Americans United like to point out, even with relatively “thin” symbols like the Decalogue, you’ve got multiple competing versions of the Big Ten to contend with. If the Narnian Final Battle with the secularists were won—or before it came to the forefront—how many of your evangelical allies would show the level of enthusiasm they did for Mel Gibson’s distinctly Catholic vision of the Passion?

That points, I think, to a more general problem: There’s increasingly not all that much of a “mass culture” to capture anyway. There was a New York Times op-ed about a year back (on another topic) noting that “Plain-vanilla Top 40, once the chief vehicle for hit songs, is now the format for only 5 percent of the nation’s 10,000-plus stations.” So if Christian families’ cultural consumption increasingly consists of Christian radio stations and Veggie Tales videos ordered online, it’s not because they’re retreating into quietism out of despair; it’s because the rain of cultural fragmentation falls on the just and unjust alike.

—posted by Julian

THE BENEFITS OF REPRESSION?

Earlier this week, I was listening to a debate on the BBC World Service on Britain’s new civil partnerships, and found myself nodding happily along at the nice Millian rhetoric trotted out by the spokesman for one of the gay rights groups there—good familiar classical liberal red meat about formal equality and social tolerance of self-regarding acts. But I also found myself wondering: Could moral progress in some sense help to undermine this kind of liberalism?

As political theorist Michael Sandel has pointed out, there are two ways you can defend (among other things) gay rights: The first is the liberal or formal way, by arguing that society (or at any rate, the law) need not concern itself with private morality or immorality, should maintain a scrupulous neutrality between different modes of life insofar as they don’t directly injure others. That sort of argument leaves open whether there is, in fact, anything more broadly wrong with gay relationships.

The other option is to offer a substantive or comprehensive argument: You can point out that the core values realized by heterosexual relationships are present in gay ones as well, and argue that they should not just be formally tolerated, but that there’s nothing morally bad about them. (Many people—such as our esteemed host—routinely make both sorts of arguments.)

Sandel’s concern is that the primacy of the first sort of argument in the public sphere gives short shrift to the second type. I find myself wondering whether a move toward agreement on questions of the second sort—which generational surveys suggest is happening, and which is in itself surely a good thing—won’t weaken the appeal of those nice Millian principles.

Liberalism was born of the anguish of Europe’s wars of religion—and by and by, what had begun as a détente of exhaustion came to be seen as a moral good in itself. But what happens when the big ticket injustices are, if not eradicated, then in retreat? In short: How much will we care about toleration and neutrality when we’re less worried that state power will be exercised in substantively wrong ways?

You can already see the drift to some extent in the ways the rights of women and racial minorities have been defended. In both cases, you initially saw the argument advanced in the classical liberal language of formal equality. Now at least some advocates of both causes have come to regard “formal equality” as a screen for white male privilege. (Recall Al Gore’s remarks about how opponents of affirmative action “use their color blind the way duck hunters use their duck blind.”) You see the potential for the same sort of drift in some defenses of civil liberties: Defenders of free expression would often rather invoke pyres outside libraries than make the case that even genuinely execrable speech deserves an opportunity to be heard, whether or not censorship would put us on a slippery slope to the suppression of speech we find substantively valuable.

That’s not—needless to say—an argument in favor of keeping some big substantive injustices around to remind us of the value of liberalism. But it is something to think about: Will we readily accept in droplets what we’ve refused to countenance in torrents?

—posted by Julian

FIGHTING WORDS

Since Julian and I probably don’t see eye to eye about . . . well, a lot of things, Matt Yglesias asks us for more brutal, no-holds-barred debating on the great issues of the day. Unfortunately, my co-blogger hasn’t said anything I radically disagree with (I’m agnostic on the great wiretapping debate), so I’m reduced to nitpicking. But I’ll take a stab at it. Here’s something Julian wrote, on Monday:

Let me suggest as a final point, though, that there may be a connection between “the real de-Christianization of Christmas” via “the frenetic pace of modern life, and the crassifying tendencies of commerce,” which bothers Ross, and an insistence on a faith-saturated public sphere. It is utterly mysterious to me when people of faith exult that some sectarian symbol-a Ten Commandments momument or an invocation of “one nation under God” in a schoolchild’s morning fealty oath-survives judicial scrutiny as mere “ceremonial deism.” Isn’t that precisely an acknowledgement that, by a kind of inverted transubstantiation, those symbols have been stripped of their meaning? The problem with pushing to embed your favored symbols in the mass culture is that you cede control of them to the mass culture-which I rather doubt is what the activists would want, on reflection.

I think the thing to recognize here is that serious Christians who worry about the naked public square don’t rejoice when a Ten Commandments display or the Pledge passes muster as “ceremonial deism.” Ceremonial deism is the last refuge of the lukewarm – the theory that lets Supreme Court Justices square their “wall of separation” notions with the pervasiveness of religious language and symbolism in American history, public architecture and public rhetoric. It’s what Stephen Breyer will sign on to, not what Antonin Scalia wants.

More generally, Julian’s certainly right that when Christians cede control of their symbols to the mass culture, it’s only a short jog to ceding control of Christianity itself to what you might call the American heresy – the gospel of success that’s made Joel Osteen the country’s bestselling “Christian” theologian, and threatens to make religious devotion just another cog in the commercial machine. This could be an argument for withdrawal and quietism – for Christians to abandon the public square entirely, and focus on cultivating an orthodox subculture in a more materialist sea. But that’s the counsel of despair. If the mass culture is really so bad for Christianity, maybe Christians ought to be doing more to change it, instead of letting it change them – which is what that whole “salt of the earth” thing was supposed to be about, I think.

Changing the culture is hard to do, of course – a lot harder than winning Pledge of Allegiance battles, or even elections. But people (right or left, but the left has understood this better for some time) who think that culture wars are mainly about politics are kidding themselves. I’ve argued this before, and Mark Helprin – one of the rare, rare American artists who leans right – made a similar point in NR’s fiftieth anniversary issue:

Conservatives have yet to approach culture as William F. Buckley approached political philosophy half a century ago. The theses of our culture are almost universally propounded by the Left – in education at all levels; publishing of all types; film and television; what used to be the fine arts; music; and in the libraries and museums, where history can be altered with an unnoticed deaccession or the flick of a caption. Looking upon all this as if silent upon a peak in Darien, Connecticut, are armies of conservatives who mainly react. There below them, stretching to the horizon, is the Pacific, and because they hesitate to swim in it, they are reduced to criticizing it. What will prevail in man’s life or imagination, the ocean or those who – even if rightly – take exception to it?

That the antitheses are usually just is irrelevant to the outcome, for here as almost everywhere the initiative rules. Consider the relative impacts of film and of film criticism; music and music criticism; education and criticism of educational fashion. Cultural abominations thrive not because they are insufficiently criticized but for lack of adequately supported competition.

Although not a few conservatives with a self-sacrificial bent are at work in the belles lettres and beaux arts, the conservative masses (what a delightful phrase) have largely ceded these fields or have been frozen in or out of them in the reactive position from which conservatives must be freed if their enterprise is to succeed and their principles are to thrive.

Conservatives and Christians are by no means perfectly overlapping categories, but Helprin’s point applies equally well to both. Julian’s right that religious believers risk a great deal when they take on the mass culture – but they risk even more when they don’t.

– posted by Ross

BROKEBACK

I saw it last night. Maybe my hopes were too high, but the movie didn’t quite sustain itself for the time it took, I felt. The short story accomplished it all with more concision and thereby with more punch. But the movie, as you’d expect with Ang Lee, had enormous integrity. Heath Ledger was magnificent in his indirection – this was a rare movie in which the anguish of the outwardly conforming, “straight-acting” gay man was exposed in all its raw pain. Three scenes remain in my mind. There’s a shot after the two men leave each other for the first time when Ennis [Ledger] stays upright and walks nonchalantly as his lover drives away. But then, as soon as his beloved is out of sight, he collapses in emotional pain, punching a wall in agony, even then having to deflect the suspicion of a stranger. The moment when they reunite – its passion, its need, its depth – ravishes with insight into what love truly is. Then there’s the scene when Ennis’ wife finally confronts him – and you can see the damage done to so many lives by the powerful, suffocating evil of homophobia. So many lives. Sometimes I start to imagine how much accumulated human pain has been inflicted for so many centuries on so many gay hearts and souls, and then I stop. It’s too much. We are slowly healing; but some wounds will never heal; and they are inscribed on the souls of millions in the past – the ones who persecuted, the ones who suffered, the ones who never let themselves be loved – or saw it briefly once, feared it and lived their lives in the lengthening shadow of their regrets. Yes, these were souls whose backs were broken. And now a new generation stands up.

– posted by Andrew

BUT THEY WERE REALLY COSMOPOLITAN CONVERSATIONS

Yesterday, I suggested that it might be difficult in this wacky, interconnected world to know which communications are really “international” ones. Apparently the NSA has the same trouble, and for something pretty close to the reason I hypothesized:

[In] at least one instance, someone using an international cellphone was thought to be outside the United States when in fact both people in the conversation were in the country. Officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the program remains classified, would not discuss the number of accidental intercepts, but the total is thought to represent a very small fraction of the total number of wiretaps that Mr. Bush has authorized without getting warrants.

—posted by Julian

HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE BOLIVIA?

It’s been easy to miss amid all the commotion over illegal wiretaps, transit strikes, and courts taking the trouble to define what is and is not science, but Bolivia just overwhelmingly elected an Indian-nationalist president who might just be Hugo Chavez’s new best friend in the region. How should we react? I don’t have a clue, but Noah Millman offers some characteristically interesting thoughts.

– posted by Ross