UP ON BROKEBACK

Well, Heath Ledger isn’t better than the best of Marlon Brando, and you can find things to dislike in it without being “an insecure idiot.” But it’s a very strong movie, one of the year’s best in a way – restrained, graceful, and moving, at once spacious and intensely personal. The initial summer on Brokeback Mountain, I thought, was the weakest section, perhaps because it’s extremely difficult for any filmmaker, lacking the luxury of interiority, to dramatize how two essentially uncommunicative people fall in love. But once you accept that Ledger’s Ennis and Gyllenhaal’s Twist are in love, the rest of the pieces of the story fall into place, and the long unhappiness of their post-Brokeback lives – and the lives of their wives – is one of the more effective stories of personal tragedy that I’ve seen onscreen of late. (Though with Capote and The Squid and the Whale, this has been a good year for the cinema of intimate tragedy.) In a sense, the people who say that this isn’t a “gay movie” are right – insofar as it’s a story of love found and then partially denied, and the human costs of that denial, its themes are universal. Indeed, it’s just a sign of how few impediments the modern world places in the way of romantic passion that this kind of story can basically only be told about homosexuals – and perhaps not even about them anymore.

But of course it is a gay movie, too, in the sense that it’s a movie that doesn’t just tell the story of two men in love, but advances certain ideas about the nature of that love. There isn’t a political agenda in Brokeback Mountain, exactly – it isn’t a brief for hate crimes laws or domestic partnerships, except by implication – but there’s unquestionably a moral and philosophical agenda, and one that’s more radical, I think, than most critics are likely to acknowledge. The film is a study in the contrast between homosexuality and heterosexuality, and the former is – almost without exception – presented as preferable to the latter, as purer and more beautiful, and ultimately as more authentically masculine. Critics have noted, rightly, how Ang Lee portrays his heroes’ wives sympathetically – particularly Michelle Williams’s Alma – and this is true, so far as it goes. But while the film invites the audience to like them and pity their plight, it also trades in the darkest stereotypes of domestic life – the squalling babies, the tiny apartments and the mounting bills, the domineering in-laws and the general claustrophobia that almost any man feels, at one point or another, in his married life, but that Brokeback Mountain portrays as being the whole of it.

To a certain extent, the drama of the movie necessitates this kind of contrast, but it’s significant, I think, that the film doesn’t offer any model of successful heterosexual masculinity, or of successful heterosexual relationships in general. The straight men are all either strutting oafs, bitter bigots like Jack Twist’s father, or “nice-guy” weaklings like Alma’s second husband, whose well-meaning effeminacy contrasts sharply with Ennis’s rugged manliness. Jack and Ennis are the only “real men” in the story, and their love is associated with the high country and the vision of paradise it offers – a world of natural beauty and perfect freedom, of wrestling matches and campfires and naked plunges into crystal rivers – and a world with no girls allowed. Civilization is women and babies and debts and fathers-in-law and bosses; freedom is the natural world, and the erotic company of men. It’s an old idea of the pre-Christian world come round again – not that gay men are real men too; but that real men are gay.

– posted by Ross

DEFENDING THE NYT

I think I should second Shafer on the NYT NSA story. Here too. Calame’s Public Editor column today seemed weak to me. The only place the NYT obviously scrwed up was in not disclosing Risen’s forthcoming book. But taking a year to verify an important story, and getting the right sources to firm it up, is good journalism. I find the notion that this somehow undermines national security a little odd. Do we really think al Qaeda members previousloy believed all their calls to the U.S. were free from any surveillance? Now that we know it for sure, will this change much? I doubt it. Instapundit’s case that the only people to blame here are the Times’ editors is underwhelming:

Since the Pentagon Papers, at least, the rule has been that papers could publish classified information in a whistleblowing mode, but that they would be sensitive to national security concerns. In return, the federal government would tread lightly in investigating where the leaks came from. But the politicization of the coverage, and the outright partisanship of the Times, has put paid to that arrangement.

I don’t get it. This is a real story, highlighting arguably illegal activity by the president, breaking with precedent and creating a warrant-free license to listen to American’s phone conversations, with no independent vetting at all. The NYT waits a year to get its facts right and its sources firm. The editors confer with the president himself, adjust the story to remove anything that might seriously jeopardize sources or intelligence, and then publish. What the hell is wrong with any of that? It seems just the right balance. One big issue for the coming year is whether we have an executive that is out of control, pushing beyond legal and constitutional limits in ways that beg pushback. This new information informs that important debate. Good for Keller and Sulzberger for exposing it.

– posted by Andrew.

A RESPONSE TO ROSS

We’ve been becoming our own version of a mini-Corner recently. Lovin’ it. Ross makes several excellent points below. I only differ with a couple. The first is about conservatism’s relationship in America with the cultural and social realities in certain regions, namely the South and West. Because I seem to leave out the West in my reading of recent Republican history, Ross and Ramesh think I’m off-base. I agree with Ross that the 1980s were conservatism’s intellectual apogee in both America and Britain – and as a young right-winger interested in ideas, I can only tell Ross what bliss it was then to be alive. The fight against the Soviets and the welfare state united all of us. But I believe the golden age of governing conservatism was actually in the mid-1990s, in that blissful period when welfare was reformed, taxes kept relatively low, spending restrained, the budget balanced, and a blast of technological creativity transformed our economy and ways of life. Yes, we even had a president then who could actually insist that “the era of big government is over.” If Bush said today what Clinton said a few years ago, he’d be laughed off-stage. Unless they’d stacked the crowd with the usual Bush-bots.

SOUTHERN DISCOMFORT: But you’ll notice something interesting about the conservative 90s. The West – the former balwark of conservatism – shifted profoundly toward the Democratic party. Reagan was unimaginable without California. Today’s GOP is unimaginable with it. And that’s the big shift of the last decade or so. The South is a powerful force, and it swiftly forced the West out of the Republican column. Only the pathetic Democrats kept the more socially liberal or libertarian wing from full defection. Maybe if McCain had won in 2000, he might have kept the Western-Southern alliance alive a little longer. But fundamentalism is an inherently expansionist philosophy. It cannot tolerate dissent the way easy-going California conservatism once did. With George W. Bush’s ascent and a fully-evolved policy of not merely coopting the South, but becoming a Southern party first and foremost, Republicanism shifted with speedily away from its previous principles and balance. War accelerated the process. The GOP is now a fundamentalist, Christian, Southern party first – and tries to cobble some more slices of the pie onto that base. With war behind it, and gay-baiting for good measure, it still managed to pull together barely 51 percent of the electorate in 2004.

WHAT WORKS: Ross’ deeper point, however, is that conservatism shifted to big-government meddling, fiscal profligacy, and religious fundamentalism because that’s where the votes are. This is a poor argument both empirically and normatively. Why, for example, did Clinton announce the “end of big government” as a way to shore up his second term? Because it would hurt him? Why did Bush’s tax cuts prove so popular? Why did a balanced budget constitutional amendment come within a whisker of passage? These, of course, are unanswerable hypotheticals. You can’t run history again; and we can argue about what might have been forever. But the second point is that a political movement, while taking note of public opinion, should say what it believes, not what people want to hear. Does Ross believe that the pro-life position should be abandoned because it doesn’t command a real majority? Or does he think that the job of political leaders is to persuade people, rather than to merely follow them? Maybe this is what sets my generation apart from Ross’. He grew up observing Clinton and the first Bush. I was lucky enough to witness Thatcher and Reagan. What Ross is telling us now – that the public wouldn’t stand smaller government – was what everyone told Reagan and Thatcher then. They took that as a challenge, not as a road-block. I’m with them; and one step in arguing for a different brand of conservatism from Bush’s is trying to explain how it coheres, what its premises are, and why it’s still very relevant. We may succeed; we may not. But if we don’t try, we’ll never know. My book is an attempt to make the case. I write it with no expectation that its outlook or recommendations will ever be implemented. But I can hope.

– posted by Andrew.