There sure were links. But what was the point of those links? A reader counters:
Saddam was very conscious of the rise of Jihadist groups and was very keen to avoid being an al Qaeda target. Al Qaeda rhetoric throughout the 90’s was very harsh and anti-Saddam, and it’s clear that they saw in his weakened regime a real opportunity to gain a foothold in the Arab world proper. Moreover, Iraq had an enormous ideological plus to them, since it had Baghdad, the historical seat of the caliphate. To this end, Saddam consciously adopted a policy of Islamification – including aspects of Koranic justice in the judicial system, e.g., putting the invocation on the flag – all outward manifestations designed to help dodge the label of "secular." Saddam was also extremely keen to penetrate al Qaeda and learn what they were up to – and that’s the basis for the relations that arose.
But what he did in this regard isn’t much different from what any smart intelligence service might have done (and notably, ours didn’t). The prospect of Saddam trying to penetrate al Qaeda and turn it to his purposes is tantalizing, but the evidence for it isn’t there, or at least not yet. I think Pillar had pretty much the same analysis. I give certain quarters credit for trying, but I’m not convinced. You have the fundamental problems that Saddam’s Baathism is totally at odds with what al Qaeda wants, and that Saddam is the showcase example for them of what a bad secular Arab ruler does.
The issue is: given our lack of certainty as to the real reason for the connections, how did we judge the risk, especially after 9/11? We may in retrospect have judged wrongly. But it is only by having invaded Iraq that we now know for sure. In that sense, the war’s objective has indeed been achieved: we have indeed disarmed Saddam. What we have unleashed is another matter.
The Dish 