This strikes me as an astonishing admission on the part of a writer who has been writing on national security for the past five years:
I haven’t engaged much in the parlor game of identifying mistakes in the occupation, because none of them (and there were many) reached a magnitude of those in World War II (e.g., daylight bombing without fighter escort in 1942-3, intelligence failures about the hedgerows, surprise at the Bulge, etc) or Korea (surprise at the Yalu). Nor were any fatal to our cause, despite the ‚Äòdisbanding‚Äô of the army, Abu Ghraib, etc.
If there were any serious blunders, they concerned the sense of hesitation that gave our enemies confidence—the sudden departure of Gen. Franks, the pullback from first Fallujah, the reprieve given Sadr, etc. In other words, once we were in a war, whatever public downside there was to using too much force was far outweighed by losing our sense of control and power, and ceding momentum to the terrorists. So we can learn from that, and begin again cracking down hard on the insurgents before calling for more troops."
This is Victor Davis Hanson. What can one say? That he does not believe that disbanding the Iraqi army was a serious blunder. Nor Abu Ghraib. Nor the troop levels. The only failing is that we did not kill enough of the enemy, that we didn’t conquer the place more effectively. Would that have meant more troops? Ooops. Didn’t mean to go there. That’s a question for those in a "parlor game".
Revealed here is the empty shell of the denialist right. No record of any constructive or even trenchant criticism during the most appalling military and foreign policy fiasco since Vietnam. Blather about World War II. No criticism of the president. Just a recipe for "cracking down hard on insurgents" with the troops we already have. Gee. No one thought of that already, did they?
The Dish 