This reader may be onto something:
I think everyone, right and left, is making a mistake in taking the ISG Report’s policy recommendations at face value. What the ISG is really up to is "enlarging the problem," as it’s known in some policy circles. By engaging other countries on the solution for Iraq, we make them part of the problem of Iraq. Then, when the problem turns out to be unsolvable, we are no longer solely to blame. The narrative then becomes, "The whole middle east – in the form of the Iraq International Support Group – tried to fix Iraq, to no avail. It’s not working, and we don’t want to participate in this larger process anymore. So we’re leaving – not so much leaving Iraq, as leaving this useless regional forum. The forum has failed, not the US, and it’s your problem now."
Remember, the Report also calls for substantial US troop reductions by 2008. Why 2008? Well, there’s this presidential election then … and two years is about enough for all that aggressive regional diplomacy to prove itself futile, so we can use it as cover to leave.
The ISG has also built in some solid CYA provisions. The Report’s recommendations have to be enacted in toto, Baker and Hamilton have argued, otherwise none of it will work. They know no commission report in the history of the Republic has been accepted in toto, and that this one won’t be, either. When Iraq disintegrates, therefore, they can say, "Not our fault. We told the president the only chance he had was if he adopted the whole report – and he didn’t."
Bottom line: Taken at face value, the Report’s policy recommendations are useless – practically irrelevant – for quelling Iraqi violence. But quelling Iraqi violence was never what the ISG set out to do. Despite the silly "way forward" rhetoric, the real purpose of the ISG was to find us a way out – and a year or two of the guaranteed-to-fail diplomacy it recommends has as good a chance of that as anything.