The Exit and Anbar

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Republicans are beginning to realize that fundamental change in the current strategy in Iraq is needed if they aren’t to face electoral collapse next year. My money is on John Warner forcing redeployment by the fall if only to save the U.S. military from being chewed up entirely by one war. Bottom line from my Sunday Times column today:

The question, of course, is whether Americans are being defeatists or realists. One way of answering this question is to ask another: if they are being defeatist in Iraq, who are they conceding defeat to? If it’s to Iraq’s Shi’ite majority, then it’s not a defeat but a victory. If it’s to the Kurds, then, again, it’s a win.

Saddam is gone. There is no longer any potential threat of weapons of mass destruction from a failed Iraqi state. The actual reasons for fighting this war in the first place have therefore evaporated.

Bush says it would be a defeat against Al-Qaeda. But Al-Qaeda was not the presence in Iraq before the war that it is now. And occupying a Muslim country indefinitely is not exactly a way to staunch jihadist recruits either.

Most grown-ups in Washington, even Obama, are arguing for a redeployment out of Iraq that would retain an active potential to take on Al-Qaeda if it were to establish an enclave in Iraq more dangerous than the base it has already established in Pakistan. And if Iraq’s Shi’ites and Sunni tribes take on Al-Qaeda in Iraq, then we will have scored a huge victory by exposing the real battle that can only be fought by Muslims against other Muslims.

These arguments are not peacenik or liberal or defeatist. They are simply a recognition of fact. The fact is that a majority of Iraqis want the Americans to leave Iraq soon; and a solid majority of Americans want the same thing. Nothing looks as if it will change those two facts in the near future. And for Republicans facing an election next year, the near future is beginning to look alarmingly imminent.

The encouraging news from Anbar, where al Qaeda has out-stayed its welcome among the local tribes, does not undermine this fact. What Anbar shows is that relative peace and stability will come only when Iraqis themselves, for reasons of their own, defend their own country from al Qaeda’s poison. We can and should continue to help them in any way we can. But the more they take the lead in defending their own country the better. Even in Anbar, however, the "national" government remains a problem, since the Sunni tribes don’t trust the Shiites in Baghdad (with good reason). The answer, it seems to me, will be gradual US withdrawal and redeployment to Kurdistan, and a soft, informal partition that gives each ethnic and religious group enough autonomy to have something to fight for.

If this war ends with a messy soft-partition, but in which various groups of Iraqi Muslims start to take on the war against al Qaeda for their own sake, it could still end up as a relative success. We will have precipitated a situation in which the real war here – within Islam, between mainstream Islam and al Qaeda – will finally be joined. We should do all we can to help from a distance, maybe even a small distance. But this is their fight not ours. We cannot win it; only they can. Our goal should not be our victory against al Qaeda; it should be their victory against al Qaeda. It will only be their victory if we are clearly on the road out. If that happens, we change the narrative of this war decisively – in our favor. But indefinite occupation prevents that scenario from taking place. Ending the occupation and winning the war, in other words, are not opposites. They can be complements. It’s a tricky process, but by far the most feasible now on the table.

(Photo: Iraq’s al-Anbar province tribe leader Abdel Sattar Abu Risha greets new US commander in Iraq General David Petraeus in Ramadi 13 March 2007. Petraeus met with tribes’ leaders after touring US and Iraqi units fighting Al-Qaeda in almost daily street battles in the city, much of which lies in ruins. By Patrick Baz/AFP/Getty.)

The Afghanistan Analogy

What the Soviets faced in Afghanistan, the US is now tackling in Iraq. Patrick Shea explains:

The Mujahideen used many of the same methods we see in Iraq today: roadside IEDs targeting convoys, bombing of Soviet sponsored government buildings, assassinations of officials and influential tribal chiefs, tactics designed to target and inflame the civilian population, and the destruction of essential infrastructure. Tribal and Islamic passions were a deliberate focus of their efforts.

The comparison with the Red Army’s preparation for war is even more striking. They attacked without sufficient intelligence, planning, and with too few troops to get the job done. They lacked understanding of the culture. They were unprepared and untrained to wage counter-insurgency operations. Their armored vehicles were vulnerable to unsophisticated attacks. The army was comprised largely of reservists. Most importantly, generals showed a dramatic inability to adjust to the situation on the ground, in large part due to indecision and stubbornness in Moscow.

Like the US in Iraq, the Soviets won every major engagement of the war by a decisive margin. Nonetheless, their successes evaporated quickly.

The notion that acknowledging this reality is somehow defeatist or merely politically opportunistic is, I fear, the same pattern of denial that has gotten us this far.

The Terror Boom

The State Department is gearing to release data showing a huge rise in terrorist incidents in the world last year, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the war on terror is focused. I fear we have cnjured up the worst of both worlds. We have picked a fight with an enemy – on his own turf, with just enough resources to lose and just enough to stir Muslim resentment to create even more terrorists. It has none of the advantages of offense; and none of defense. And we have a president insisting that he won’t budge.

HIV In San Francisco

A success story no one wants to hear:

While there was a ten percent decrease in total estimated new [HIV] cases, this seemingly modest decrease is actually a much greater prevention success than it appears. From 2001 to 2006, the estimated number of gay men living in San Francisco increased from 46,800 to 58,343. The increase was likely due to real growth in the gay community and, potentially, in part the result of an underestimation of the population size in 2001.

When the effect of the increase in the population size of [men having sex with men] is taken into account, new infections have decreased by an estimated 33 percent.

Sero-sorting – condom-free sex between people of the same HIV status – is a big reason why.