For the past several months, those of us skeptical that the surge is big enough or powerful enough to put the genie of a unraveling sectarian Iraq back into the bottle have had little evidence to gainsay us. The reduction of violence to 2005 levels remains a great achievement, but it is not directly related to the professed point of the surge, which was national political reconciliation. In fact, in some ways, Petraeus’ pragmatic responses to local and regional forces have made greater calm more dependent on a fractured and decentralized Iraq, with various militias, tribes and politicians in various areas making their own deals with the US and one another to secure local control.
But the passage of the law allowing for more Sunnis and former Baathists to take part in the national government’s structure is new. It’s a genuine success of the kind we were once promised. It’s the first actual data point that suggests some kind of reconciliation may be possible in Baghdad. Nonetheless, I don’t think it’s churlish to be cautious. There are many, many caveats in the press, let alone in the Byzantine and treacherous currents of Iraqi politics. There’s a chance that reigniting these issues at the center could spark more violence in the regions. Then there’s doubt about the actual law itself:
While the measure would reinstate many former Baathists, some political leaders said it would also force thousands of other former party members out of current government jobs and into retirement — especially in the security forces, where American military officials have worked hard to increase the role of Sunnis. One member of Iraq’s current de-Baathification committee said the law could even push 7,000 active Interior Ministry employees into retirement.
I guess we’ll find out soon enough what’s really there. Petraeus has wisely refrained from triumphalism of any kind and seemed to emphasize local, bottom-up efforts rather than national ones:
"Reconciliation is more than national legislation. It is also what we’re seeing in the provinces and around the country. There is more political activity. There is more cross-sectarian political activity."
What does all this mean? No one can know for sure. Except for this: if there is any indication of national reconciliation, even if it is fleeting and ephemeral and qualified, the argument for sinking more money and time into Iraq will, it seems to me, gain strength.
If the Congress couldn’t force withdrawal in the circumstances of last summer, I can’t see how it will do so in the future when the war’s objectives seem marginally less out-of-reach. In other words, I suspect that the fundamental quid-pro-quo offered to the anti-war forces – once we get calm, we can withdraw – is in fact the reverse of the truth. The more calm there is, the more the basic rationale of the neocons will revive: this is part of an empire we can keep. So why go anywhere?
Since the failure of nerve by the opposition last summer, the US has effectively decided to occupy Iraq for the rest of our lives. We had a choice: ten months or ten years, and by default we picked the latter – and, according to McCain, it’s more like a hundred years. This is very hard to undo, given the quicksand of a Muslim country that requires you either get out quickly or settle in for a looong occupation. Whether the Iraq that emerges is a meaningful state, or whether it is an effectively dismembered hodge-podge of regions held together by US troops and local forces, becomes less relevant once you accept Bush’s premise that the US has absorbed the area as a client state for the indefinite future. He has had five years to entrench this into the global order and American politics and, simply by not budging, he has changed the facts on the ground. Iraq, I suspect, is now America’s for ever – something Iraqis will always resent but never be able to reverse.
Some withdrawal of troops may well be possible in the years ahead, if we’re lucky. But the only real question will be the prudence and method of various ways to lighten the load. I doubt Bush will withdraw below the pre-surge level in the next year. A president McCain would be able to but seems unable to tolerate any indication that we’re cutting our losses. A president Clinton will be the most constrained: terrified of being tarnished as soft on terror, the Clintonites will retain their defensive crouch and be forced to keep more troops there to protect their right flank than even a Republican might. Obama? He’s a pragmatist. He won’t be able to get us out of there as quickly as he now seems to imply. Perhaps, he can negotiate a better deal. But he’s not a miracle worker, and six years of occupation make the interlocking destinies of both countries more and more hard to disentangle.
Welcome to Empire: an endless, grueling slog in treacherous places where no one loves us, but which we cannot leave. Fewer casualties perhaps (and that, of course, is a wonderful thing); but more debt, more money, more treasure, more risk, more Muslim resentment and more blowback in the end. But marginally cheaper oil in the long run, perhaps. Lovely, isn’t it?
(Photo: A US soldier from the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, is reflected on water logged on a street during a patrol at an area in Baghdad, 13 January 2008. By Jewel Samad/AFP/Getty Images.)
The Dish 