At some point, the binary abstractions of the Podhoretzes will have to give way to actual statecraft:
It’s not just Hizbullah. In dealing with many such groups—Hamas, the Taliban—the Bush administration has adopted a macho, exclusively military approach. All three of these groups have a political base in their societies that is deep and enduring. Denouncing them as evil and promising to destroy them will not change that; in fact, doing so only adds to their mystique of resistance and struggle. What we need is a political strategy to combat, contest and weaken the appeal of these groups or to marginalize their violent factions. Such a policy would naturally involve some contact with their leaders, but as part of a much broader effort to engage all groups in these societies politically.
We are trying to handle Lebanon with one hand tied behind our back. We will not make contact with the Syrians or the Iranians to find out if their interests are identical, or to discern the contours of a deal. We have little political leverage and we refuse to engage in a process that might give us some.
And, of course, we have talked to Iran and need to talk to Iran if we are ever to get out of Iraq responsibly. Yes, there are genuine debates about how and when to talk or meet with foreign leaders of enemy states. But most of them have to do with the prudence of a particular time and place. Ruling such possibilities our of bounds in advance is about electoral politics, not geo-strategy. Which is, one suspects, what motivates a lot of this White House.
The Dish 