James Surowiecki is still wary of nationalization:
Let’s be honest. When the historical record of successful nationalization in response to a banking crisis consists of one or two examples (Sweden and perhaps Japan), then the historical record doesn’t prove anything, because the sample size is way too small to draw any meaningful conclusions. The best we can say is that in one particular case, a particular strategy worked. That’s a piece of evidence in favor of nationalization, but there’s no reasonable way to say it proves, or even makes it likely, that nationalization is the right approach.
His other worry:
One of the obvious concerns about having the government nationalize major banks is that it will create a contagion effect, scaring private capital away from all banks, not just the obviously insolvent ones. If that happens, the result will be that instead of only having to recapitalize a few banks, the government will end up having to recapitalize most or all of them, expanding the costs to taxpayers and making it more likely that the government will end up running most of the banking system for an extended period of time.
The Dish 