by Patrick Appel
Wilkinson debates moral realism:
I’m definitely a realist about institutional facts, such as the fact that I own my 1996 Honda Civic. As John Searle helpfully puts it, these kinds of facts are ontologically subjective — they are facts in virtue of mental states — but epistemically objective. If you believe that I don’t own my 1996 Civic, you’re just wrong. I do own it. And I have a piece of paper from the State of Iowa that proves it. That this piece of paper proves it is due to a firmly-established, widely-shared set of beliefs and intentions.
I think moral facts are a lot like the fact that I own my car. But the firmly-established, widely-shared beliefs, sentiments, and dispositions to judgment in virtue of which moral claims are true or false vary over time and space. I do think some of these moral facts give us rationally authoritative reasons for action, but others don’t. (There are bad moralities!) So, I’m still not sure whether or not I count as a moral realist.
The Dish 