by Zack Beauchamp
Steve Walt, in response to Jonathan's post kicking off the "spatlet" on 1812's awesome awesomeness, tallys up the U.S.' record with respect to starting wars well and ending them badly. But his analysis of the Gulf War is odd:
Gulf War I: Started well (Security Council Resolution and big coalition) and ended pretty well too (going to Bagdad would have been a mistake, as we learned a decade later).
It's simply not the case that the American experience in Iraq in 2003 is at all demonstrative of what would have happened in 1991. They're quite dissimilar wars. First and foremost, in 1991 Shi'a and Kurdish Iraqis were in open revolt against Saddam – inspired by the Bush administration! Our refusal to protect the anti-Saddam rebels directly caused the mass slaughter of Shi'a and Kurdish Iraqis (rebel and civilian alike), which can't but have had an effect on the way they saw America. Since Shi'a groups like the Mahdi Army played an integral role in fomenting post-war chaos, Shi'a perception of Americans is rather important. The imminent mass slaughter of civilians also changes the moral calculus about intervention from the 2003 context somewhat considerably.
Second, al-Qaeda was not nearly as well established as an organization, and conceivably there may never have been an al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Third, we had twice as many troops to conduct the occupation with. The Powell Doctrine was in effect, what with Powell being Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all, and one of the keys to success in occupation and counterinsurgency is a high troop to population ratio. Also, we weren't fighting a war in Afghanistan then.
Fourth, Bush I was a much more competent President, with a much more competent set of advisors and staff, than Bush II.
Finally, we had a real coalition backing us and faced substantially less international hostility from non-partner countries. It may have been the case that said coalition would have evaporated if American forces had marched on Baghdad, but it's also possible that it could have meant significantly more international support for post-war reconstruction.
I'm not saying it's beyond dispute that H.W. messed up – deciding to widen a war is a tough call. And counterfactuals are always tricky. But it's wrong to say our recent experience in Iraq simpliciter settled the question of whether expanding the war in 1991 was a good idea.
The Dish 