by Zack Beauchamp
Just in time to coincide with the announcement of U.S. recognition of the NTC as Libya's legitimate government, Dov Zakheim posts a fabulously unsupported collection of assertions about the war. Where to begin:
It should come as no surprise that the Libyan rebels have committed atrocities in towns they have captured. The Libyan civil war is nothing more than a tribal blood feud, stoked by hatreds, grievances and desires for revenge that go back decades if not longer. In such circumstances it is a fool's errand to determine which of the warring parties has right on its side. That the United States and NATO chose to interject themselves into this conflict is simply incomprehensible.
Much like in Afghanistan, it's always the tribes! Except when it's not not. Libyan tribal feuds do not principally shape the country and they are not the main drivers of the current conflict. As for "incomprehensible," the looming mass slaughter of civilians in Benghazi might have something to do with it. He continues:
NATO's Libyan adventure is proving costly not merely in terms of human and material losses. Qaddafi’s successful achievement of what is effectively a stalemate to the conflict has seriously damaged the alliance's credibility. NATO has projected an image of disunity and inefficiency at best, incompetence at worst. It is hard to imagine that this was the alliance that faced down the Soviet Union.
The fact that airpower did not end the conflict immediately does not make it a stalemate. Rebel forces are advancing, Qaddafi appears to be looking for a diplomatic exit, and regime spokespeople are admitting the government is running out of fuel and ammunition. It's tough to be confident about these things, but I'd bet on the rebels.
On the credibility point, even if we assume that "credibility" is any more on the line than it is when normally invoked by neocons to justify their foreign policy preference, there's no way to know the ultimate effect of the operation on NATO until we find out how it ends. In 10 years, this could be remembered by other states the same way that Kosovo is.
More:
Moreover, to many in the Arab and Muslim world, the Western attack on yet another Arab state smacks of nothing less than treachery and hypocrisy. After all, Qaddafi had cooperated with the West in the "war on terror." For that Washington, Paris and London rewarded him with drone attacks on his family. On the other hand, Bashar al-Assad's support for Hezbollah has earned him a free pass.
Data, please? The recent Zogby* poll on this issue showed the issue was very low on the priority list of Arab publics and, further, in the only country where more than a small fraction of the population cared about Libya – Lebanon – a plurality thought Obama's handling of the issue would improve Arab-American relations. Now, this is bad news for the Administration's line on Libya for other reasons, but it means that Zakheim's suggestion that Libya is seriously damaging our image in the Muslim world is without foundation.
One last time:
Finally, to underscore the fact that no good Libyan deed has gone unpunished, the Western attack has come only a few years after Qaddafi chose to terminate his attempt to obtain nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea will surely take note. "What if," pundits in Pyongyang and Tehran surely are asking,"Qaddafi had possessed 'the bomb'? Would the West have dared to attack him?" What if, indeed.
NATO, aided, abetted and cheered on by Washington, clearly has achieved little and lost much. Surely it is time to terminate this mindless, costly and counterproductive exercise.
I'm confused here: doesn't North Korea already have nuclear weapons? Doesn't Iran already have a nuclear program? Does anyone seriously think that Pyongyang was itching to hand over its nukes, but is so scared of a limited air campaign that they're going to hold on to them? Those are two pretty awful examples for the proliferation incentive argument (which, by the way, has never been proven and, if true, should imply that Kosovo and the Iraq wars have already convinced dictators to get nukes).
Oh, and wouldn't quitting the mission half way do the same number on NATO's credibility as it did on a certain ex-governor's?
*We should also take this poll with a grain of salt. A Middle East expert I spoke to on this issue suggests that the impact of Obama's handling of the events of the Arab Spring won't be clear for another five to ten years, so polls like this are next to useless in evaluating policy. How Arabs will remember the Libya intervention is by no means set in stone at this point.
The Dish 