As the intelligence community celebrates al-Qaeda's near-defeat, Ackerman argues that moving from "near" to "total" is simply a matter of how we think about it:
Victory against al-Qaida isn't just a battlefield circumstance, an argument won in Tahrir Square or a missile aimed at an al-Shabaab commander. It's a conscious strategic decision taken by politicians to say: the costs of this campaign are vastly out of proportion to the actual threat posed by al-Qaida, and so it is time to drive those costs down into something proportional.
That is what victory actually is: terrorism as a managable threat, not to be dealt with through a perpetual global war. Once we harden some domestic targets, maximize the 'Americanness' of U.S. Muslims, bolster the defensive capabilities of key foreign allies — their populations more than their security apparat — then we can slow down the drone strikes responsibly, replace them with ISR orbits and do some strikes and roundups as necessary, harassing al-Qaida's residual capability to regenerate itself. The 9/11 era ends on our terms.
David Ignatius, drawing from this report, prepares for the inevitable future attacks. Adam Kirsh wonders why we haven't produced any great literary chroniclers of this period.
The Dish 