Julian Sanchez explains Madman Theory:
During the cold war, [Nixon] notoriously developed his “madman theory,” a stratagem of having senior aides circulate their “concerns” that Nixon had gone unhinged, and might just hit that big red button if provoked, even though the consequences of a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union would clearly be catastrophic for the United States even in “victory” (if that term is even intelligible in the context of nuclear war). Nixon faced the problem of “credible commitment,” as game theorists call it: It’s hard to use a threat as leverage when it would clearly be irrational for you to actually make good on that threat. An opponent who thinks you’re rational, therefore, will discount the threat as an empty bluff. But if your opponent thinks you’re crazy—crazy enough to make good on a threat even when it means mutual ruin—they may just be inclined to give you what you want.
He thinks the GOP has ressurected this tactic for debt ceiling negotiations. Weigel says the base has yet to come around:
Republicans still have a problem as they put together votes. They haven't done the legwork convincing their base that something with such a scary ring — "raising the debt ceiling!" — is actually necessary. For all the concessions they've gotten, and they are massive, they are not yet past this. They're being egged on by their activist base and by the Republicans who appeal to them. Jon Huntsman was the only presidential candidate who endorsed Boehner's plan. Did you notice?
The Dish 