Peter Vine thinks the Syrian protestors are collapsing Turkey's "zero-problems" approach to its Middle East neighbors:
As the protests inch closer and closer to home, Turkey faces an unprecedented foreign policy challenge as a tense Lebanon combines with a mass protest movement in Israel, a surge in violence in Iraq and a Syria in meltdown. This has seen Turkey in some ways revert to type as its unilateral tendencies start to re-appear. Already Turkey has darkly hinted that what is happening in Syria is an "internal Turkish matter" as it frets about the possibility of a long porous border becoming a backdoor for Kurdish terrorism. Nobody is predicting a Turkish intervention in Syria, but then again few had predicted the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
The options for Turkey now are limited. It can either wait and see or follow its zero-problems strategy and simply shift its stance to accommodate the new order falling across the Middle East.
Ariel Cohen sees a conflict with Iran on the horizon:
If Turkey abandons the pro-Iranian Assad, which it is in the process of doing, it will face another strategic headache: a confrontation with Tehran. Until now Turkey played a sophisticated game of rapprochement with Syria’s Shi’a patron, increasing trade and lobbying for Iran in the international arena. However, the demise of the Assad clan may open a new avenue for the Sunni Turkish Islamic AK Party, which is also close to the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition force in Syria and in Egypt.
And herein lies the rub. The Middle East historically has five power centers: three Arab (Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad) and two non-Arab: Iran and Turkey. As one of these (Damascus) undergoes a meltdown, and two others (Cairo and Baghdad) are very weak, the remaining two non-Arab centers are doomed by history and geography to compete.
The Dish 