by Zack Beauchamp
Joel Wing reviews two new studies on the impact of the Surge in Iraq:
The Surge has gone through a lot of mythologization and simplification over the last couple years. U.S. military tactics, leadership, and soldiers have been emphasized by many as the reasons for Iraq’s turn around. Americans reading and writing about Iraq obviously tend towards Americancentric views like these. Thiel and Ollivant challenged many of these beliefs.
Thiel found that troop numbers alone were not enough to explain why violence went down in Iraq. Ollivant tried to change people’s focus from America’s actions, to those of Iraqis. Iraqi agency he argued, is often ignored. When he looked at them, he found the roots of the end of the sectarian war before and during the Surge. The Sunnis’ decision to give up their fight with the Shiites, and the Shiites realization that they were safely in power, both of which happened before the Surge started, were more important for Ollivant than anything the Americans would later do. Together, both believed that the U.S. had a role in ending the Iraqi civil war, but they were not as a paramount as others have argued.
Previous coverage of Ollivant's paper here. His point about Iraqi agency is important, and extends to the Iraqi ability to reject al-Qaeda in Iraq's rule. AQI's theologically mandated bruality played some role in the collapse of its popular support. Indeed, one the best reasons to be optimistic about the coming collapse of radical Islamism is that, whenever it gets the opportunity to govern, its repugnant agenda manages to undermine its own authority.
The Dish 