by Zack Beauchamp
Nikolas Gvosdev (free subscription required) sees Libya as proof-of-concept for low-cost intervention:
The course of events in Libya over the past months validates what I have termed the "just enough" doctrine. The Obama administration successfully resisted pressure — from Libyan rebels, European allies and domestic critics alike — to increase the U.S. role in order to achieve a faster outcome in Libya. If that doctrine takes on greater coherence, it could strengthen the arguments for limited, targeted assistance in other such situations. In other words, it may present a way to square the growing demands for fiscal austerity with the ongoing challenge of maintaining America's position as a global leader.
Stewart Patrick largely agrees. Chris Rawley thinks the conventional Army won't have much to do in this new type of war:
There is little role for a large standing army in supporting the national security of the United States once we have pulled out of our manpower-intensive counterinsurgency fights. What does an armored force give us against an opposing armored force when air dominance allows us to slice and dice enemy armored divisions? (And if we didn’t have air supremacy, we wouldn’t commit large numbers of conventional ground troops to be slaughtered by an opposing air force anyway). How often do we use artillery to suppress threats in a collateral damage adverse world now that we have on call ISR over-watch and precision guided munitions? And why on earth would we deploy a large conventional infantry force for constabulary duty in another protracted ground war given the lessons (relearned) in Iraq and Afghanistan?
I don't know about "protracted" or "large," but some humanitarian interventions might require conventional infantry units. Rwanda is a good example (pdf). That's the nub of the argument for caution about generalizing from Libya – yes, we may have found a model that succeeded in toppling Qaddafi, but there's no guarantee the same conditions that made that success possible will attain in the next humanitarian emergency. If heading off another catastrophe seems like it would require a significant troop deployment, we should debate it on those terms, weighing the real costs and benefits rather than blithely invoking Qaddafi or Milosevic.
The Dish 