by Zack Beauchamp
In his requiem for Petraeus' military career, Spencer Ackerman makes a good point about the Surge debate:
Yes, Petraeus is not solely responsible for the decline in violence. He capitalized on a historic blunder by al-Qaida, who grabbed defeat from the jaws of victory by violently alienating the very Iraqi Sunnis it needed for support. But Petraeus’ critics who make that point aren’t diminishing the general’s achievements as much as they might think. Unlike his predecessors in command — or at the Pentagon — Petraeus had the foresight to embrace the Sunni Awakening, even though it contained ex-insurgents with American blood on their hands.
Remember that the Bush administration’s strategy for Iraq (.PDF) didn’t ever envision aligning with Sunni insurgents against al-Qaida. In the absence of strategic guidance from his civilian commander, Petraeus improvised, relying on his understanding of counterinsurgency that he pushed on the Army during his 2005-6 interregnum running the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. It yielded the best outcome that the United States could have experienced in Iraq.
The debate over counterinsurgency often treats the idea like something that can be discussed absent context: "COIN works! No, it's a stupid theory!" In reality, whether or not COIN can work in a given context is highly dependent on locally specific factors, including how the insurgent thinks about the conflict. Petraeus succeeded here because he picked a strategy that was comparatively better than AQI's given the state of Iraq at that time. The debate over "counterinsurgency" writ large isn't all that helpful compared to examining the contours of whatever conflict someone advocates applying the doctrine to. Four other interesting takes on Petraeus here.
The Dish 