Andrew Stroehlein worries about growing US ties with the Uzbek regime:
For [a] weak, and probably temporary, supply point, Washington is willing to close its eyes to the oppression and corruption of the Karimov regime, which, when it ends, will surely do so very violently precisely because of its very nature. Not only is there no post-Karimov succession plan in place for an old, and by all accounts unwell, ruler, there is a fundamental axiom at work: the more brutal the dictatorship, the more likely its end will be associated with mass violence.
Joshua Foust counters:
The case for the U.S. to not work with Uzbekistan is founded on really poor assumptions. It requires assuming the Washington-Tashkent will be equivalent to much different relationships for very different purposes. It requires assuming incompetence in an area where the U.S. military in particular is very skilled. It requires assuming something will happen that most likely will not based on a similar experience nearby. And, lastly, it requires adopting an alternative course of action that has an even smaller chance of success.
The Dish 