The Great Divorce

Britain’s relationship with Europe has degenerated into, well, if not a full divorce yet, then a not so amicable separation. The Economist’s Charlemagne sees it as a French victory:

President Nicolas Sarkozy had long favoured the creation of a smaller, “core” euro zone, without the awkward British, Scandinavians and eastern Europeans that generally pursue more liberal, market-oriented policies. And he has wanted the core run on an inter-governmental basis, ie by leaders rather than by supranational European institutions. This would allow France, and Mr Sarkozy in particular, to maximise its impact. Mr Sarkozy made substantial progress on both fronts.

Johnnie Freedland explains it all very eloquently above. The Economist’s Bagehot columnist has a helpful guide to the Cameron-Merkel relationship, and how it foundered, despite some promise. I stick by my view that Cameron did what he had to do. Niall Ferguson and I – surprise! – agree on this one:

It is not that British policy has dramatically changed. The real historical turn is the one now being taken by the 17 euro zone members and the six non-euro states that have chosen to follow them. For there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that what they have just agreed to do is to create a federal fiscal union. Moreover, it is a fundamentally flawed one.

The logic of the new agreement (not a treaty, because of Britain’s veto), is an increasingly centralized Europe, with national governments basically submitting their budgets to Berlin for approval. Britain did not fight two world wars to give Germany ultimate control of its internal finances. Britain’s recalcitrance will also – paradoxically – speed up the deal, because such an compact does not require as elaborate a system of agreement as a full-fledged universal treaty – you know, things like asking the people of various countries if they want to be run from Berlin via Brussels, or not. Whatever the EU is about, it is not grass roots democracy.

I have to say, though, that Cameron’s reason – protecting the City of London from meddling – is weak. The real reason is that his own party would have exploded had Cameron agreed to a new treaty, and in any referendum on it, the British people would almost certainly have said no anyway.