A group of people in Pyongyang:
[I]f much of the outside world saw Kim Jong-Il as a combination of enigma and rogue, his reputation within North Korea is more difficult to assess. Of course, internal North Korean propaganda built up Kim – as it had his father, who is still widely revered – as a hero of near-superhuman abilities, venerated by all his compatriots. But defectors’ reports suggest the view of Kim within his country is more mixed. Kim Jong-Il is associated both with the trauma of famine and crisis in the late 1990s, and with limited steps toward economic reform in the early 2000s that have since been scaled back.
[H]e was a vicious and cruel man. He enriched himself and his cronies as the North Korean people suffered through famine, forced labor, and other cruelties. Kim ran a mafia-state that profited off of a variety of criminal enterprises. He took advantage of his democratic adversaries’ unwillingness to take him on, and made money by selling illegal narcotics, weapons, and counterfeit goods and dollars on the international black market. He made the world a more dangerous place through his ruthless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic weapons. He killed South Koreans in cold blood and kidnapped Japanese citizens. Meanwhile, we and our friends bailed him out time and again.
Yes, according to State Department human-rights reports and the few defectors to make it out of North Korea, there are gulags in remote areas for the wrong-thinking. But on the whole, there seems little in the way of independent thought to censor. One foreign resident of Pyongyang, when asked on our trip in 2000 if he had ever seen any evidence of dissent–even over drinks with North Korean associates–responded: "Never. Nothing." North Korea's regime has come the closest of any society to what Orwell called, in 1984, the literal inability to conceive an unorthodox thought. If one sets aside the fact that North Korea is an economic sinkhole, and that its freedom-loving enemies are crowding in upon it from every side, it may even be called the most successful totalitarianism in modern history.
Hard even to conceive of the potential implications at this point; it’ll take a little while to have an understanding of whether Kim Jong-un will succeed his father, de facto or only de jure
Kim Jong-un has apparently begun to put his own people in place, but it’s hard to imagine that such a process is complete or irreversible. There are many fissures within North Korean society, and relatively few individuals who can bridge those gaps to project power across the system. This works in the favor of the Kim family, which remains at the center of power.
What we don't know is whether there might be cleavages within the family or other disconnects between the family and the bureaucracy that might emerge as points of conflict as the process unfolds.
It’s possible that Kim Jong-un will succeed with a tighter control over the country, indeed that seems to have been the point of the grooming over the last year, but it seems more likely that Kim Jong-il’s death will open the door for some contest – that’s if there is anyone left to purge.
[P]rediction: Kim Jong-un's succession will lead to a popular uprising in North Korea.
Standing by [my] N. Korea prediction of [democratic transition probability] at 1%.
I expect that some people are going to take his death to mean that the regime will be on the verge of collapse or that they will be more accommodating to demands to denuclearize. As I have always said the regime in North Korea is more then just one man. There is an entire regime elite of people that are dependent on keeping the current form of government in place. I don’t expect much to change in regards to North Korea’s foreign policy. I think they will continue to play the brinkmanship game in return for international aid.
Even now that regime succession is under way in the DPRK, the 'strategic patience' that many (including those in the US government) have exercised will not necessarily be rewarded with denuclearisation, especially if Kim Jong-Un … , the youngest son and designated successor to Kim Jong-Il, holds on to the reins of power.
Why? Because nuclear weapons are deeply enmeshed in both DPRK politics and the political legacy of the Kim family.
South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reports that the “short-range” missile was fired into “into the sea off [North Korea's] east coast” just hours after the announcement of Kim’s death. No one appears to be hurt, and it seems that the test was planned in advance. But the message is clear enough: North Korea wants the 28,000 U.S. troops on its southern frontier to know that now is not the time to mess with it.
The South Koreans are on the same paged. In the hours since Kim died, they’ve beefed up airport security, banned their citizens from travelling north, and stressed “peace and stability” with their northern neighbor. No one wants to provoke the new Pyongyang leadership at a time when its grasp on power might not be absolute, a situation that lends itself to violent miscalculation.
The greatest threat Kim Jong-Il poses in death, just as in life, is not that his state will commit an act of unprovoked aggression, but that it will collapse. Though he likely spent much of his final year preparing for his son's smooth take-over, it may not have been enough time. What little we know of North Korea's leadership suggests that a regime under young Kim Jong-Un could invite challenges from the military or even from his own political circle. We don't know for sure if Kim Jong-Un has as much power as his father, but either way there is reason to worry about the state's stability under his rule. If he really is in complete control, the reports on his intelligence suggest he will stumble, at which points military leaders worried about the country's stability may be tempted to intervene. If, however, his power is less total, then that will invite jockeying between political and military leaders for influence, something that North Korea's tightly regimented political system was never made to account for.
We collectively need to determine who's in control and how effective that control is. If it appears that instability is rapidly unfolding, the surrounding countries will respond in different ways. It will be critically important how the respective countries navigate through this fog. A compounding effect will be various countries misreading of each other's defensive preparations and military movements. It's paramount that the leaders of the resident powers in the region engage in clear and regular communication with each other during this fog.
The South Korean Twittersphere erupted with various responses. Although the death of one of the world's most notorious dictators is something people might welcome, most South Koreans have expressed concern about the instability his sudden death might bring to Korean peninsula.
Among the [Chinese social network] Weibo responses from ordinary users, however, nationalism was not necessarily the dominant response – often cynicism and humor were, regarding both the North Korea-China relationship and the nature of authoritarian regimes. "Does the system of hereditary monarchy belongs to the socialism with Korean characteristics?" one Weibo user wrote. "If Kim Jong Un becomes the new leader of DPRK, it certainly shows the essence of North Korea as a feudalist country," wrote another. And one more, "DPRK lost a fat man again." And, then, too, a series of bawdy jokes, like this one: "Kim Jong Il died of overwork. Yes, he had six wives – anyone would become fatigued. And was there a lot of sex on the train?" (Kim Jong Il was famously afraid of flying, and always took a special secure train on trips to China.)
As much as Americans might glimpse the end of the Kim regime, Chinese leaders have worried for decades about a surge of starving refugees pouring over the border on foot across the Tumen River, which is frozen this time of year and perfectly suited for crossing. And now China will move swiftly to prevent that possibility, sending food, fuel, arms, and whatever else is needed. John Delury, an American Korea-watcher at Yonsei University, told me today, “We pretty much know what the Chinese will do: they will squeeze their bear hug tighter than they already have, and they are the best prepared for this. They have channels, they can pick up the phone and call people.”
South Korean shares tumble 4.87% following announcement of Kim Jong Il’s death…Korean defence stocks jumped and reached the 15% daily limit.
The Dish 