Jonas Renz goes point-by-point with Mark Lynch on intervention in Syria:
While I agree arming the opposition would raise the level of violence in the short term, I find surprising that [Lynch] draws the conclusion it may not increase the likelihood of regime collapse. This assertion contradicts the view of Adm. John Stavridis who testified that arming the rebels would help the opposition to push Assad from power.
Assad’s crackdown involves for the most part Soviet ear helicopter and 40 year-old APCs and tanks. How could one deny modern anti-tank and air-defence equipment would make a significant difference? What would be the impact on Assad troops’ morale if their casualties, which are minimal so far, mount? Could rebels carve out a safe-haven on their own in Idlib where the terrain gives them an advantage for their guerilla operations? Would Assad need to deploy more troops and armor against a well-armed insurgency? What would that mean for his resources, funding and command&control capacities? [Lynch] seems to ignore to ignore these questions and the testimony of military commanders altogether stating that not even the likelihood of ousting Assad would improve if rebels were armed.
The Dish 