Libya Fights Back

It was a dramatic weekend in Libya, starting on Friday when tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets in Benghazi to protest against Islamist militias, including Ansar al-Sharia, the group many believe to be behind the attack on the US consulate there. Then after the main demonstration ended, many protesters regrouped to storm several militia compounds:

Chanting "Libya, Libya," hundreds of demonstrators entered, pulling down militia flags and torching a vehicle inside the compound, Ansar al-Sharia's main base in Benghazi – once the base of forces of former leader Muammar Gaddafi. The crowd waved swords and even a meat cleaver, crying "No more al Qaeda!" and "The blood we shed for freedom shall not go in vain!"

"After what happened at the American consulate, the people of Benghazi had enough of the extremists," said demonstrator Hassan Ahmed. "They did not give allegiance to the army. So the people broke in and they fled."

Though one militia fought back, resulting in eleven deaths, others simply evacuated, and their compounds were subsequently taken over by the Libyan military. In fact the government quickly took advantage of the opportunity to coordinate a crackdown on the militias, later announcing that all illegitimate armed groups must either submit to government authority or disband:

The announcement of the ban came hours after two armed groups said they would lay down their weapons and leave their bases in the eastern city of Derna. Derna residents say five military camps are now empty, after Abu Slim and Ansar al-Sharia, the two main militias in the area, withdrew.

"Abu Slim had three camps and Ansar al-Sharia had two. So it's five. Empty. All empty," Siraj Shennib, a 29-year-old linguistics professor who has been part of protests against the militias, told the Reuters news agency by telephone.

The Abu Slim and Ansar al-Sharia decisions were said to have been motivated by events in Benghazi on Friday.

Ranj Alaaldin cautions:

[Simply driving the militias underground] will compound existing security problems because it means militias could switch to operating as small units, instead of larger groups that are more easily identified and targeted. The government could still try to eliminate militias in their new form, but it remains doubtful that the state army, usually suited to targeting larger military formations and identifiable headquarters, has the organisation, experience and effectiveness to combat smaller, dispersed units that might continue and even increase their hit-and-run operations.

Moreover, this implies that the government is abandoning the idea of a reconciliatory process in favour of direct armed confrontation. That could be problematic in an unstable post-conflict environment that has yet to remedy differences between existing rulers and their predecessors. It could also be detrimental because of the links militias have with local regions and neighbourhoods. Some have extensive tribal, political and familial ties. The ramifications of this will be all the more severe because of the lack of state control and a functioning security force.

 Daniel Serwer also adds cold water:

We should not take much satisfaction from retribution.  What is needed is justice, which requires a serious investigation, a fair trial and an appropriate punishment.

Also needed are reliable, unified and disciplined security forces:  police, army, intelligence services.  This is one of the most difficult tasks in any post-war, post-dictatorship society.  Demobilization of the militias really is not possible until the new security institutions are able to start absorbing at least some of their cadres. Reform of security services and reintegration of former fighters are two sides of the same coin:  establishing the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Still though, many around the world are savoring the Libyans' resolve:

If his death actually catalyzes Libya's new-born democracy into a more stable state, then it will not have been in vain. Arab democracy was his life's work.