The Supreme Court heard arguments Wednesday in Salinas v. Texas this week, in which Genovevo Salinas’ refusal to answer a question during interrogation was used as evidence of his guilt during trial. Dominic Perella explains the ramifications:
The jury convicted Salinas, and the question now is whether the prosecution went too far. The answer turns on what the Fifth Amendment means. That amendment–the basis for the famous Miranda warnings–says that “[n]o person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” But what does it mean to be “compelled”? … [P]rosecutors can’t tell the jury that it suggests guilt when a defendant decides not to testify at trial. That would be “compelling” the defendant to give evidence against himself, the court has explained, because the defendant is being punished for remaining silent.
That is the basis for Salinas’ appeal. This case is no different from silence at trial, his lawyers say, because Salinas was punished for exercising his right not to incriminate himself, and that kind of punishment compels defendants to talk. And, his lawyers have pointed out in court filings, a ruling against Salinas could change police practices nationwide. If what the police did in Salinas’ case is constitutional, they wrote, then police in all investigations “will have an incentive” to convince suspects to talk by telling them “that any silence could be used against them at trial.”
Lyle Denniston tries to read the tea leaves:
If the sentiment that seems to run high in a Supreme Court hearing dictated how a case would come out, the Justices might well be on their way to declaring that the Constitution forbids prosecutors from telling juries that a suspect’s silence when talking to police in any criminal investigation means he is guilty. The argument Wednesday in Salinas v. Texas (12-246) showed the appeal of treating silence in response to police questions as too ambiguous to be allowed as proof of guilt.
But some hesitancy set in here and there, because several of the Justices were puzzled about how to write a new Fifth Amendment opinion that actually would work to protect the right against self-incrimination when a suspect meets with police, without being arrested or further detained and before “Miranda warnings” are required or given.
Robin Hagan Cain worries that upholding Salinas’ conviction will make interrogations more difficult:
If a majority finds a suspect’s pre-arrest silence can be offered against him, wouldn’t the ruling ultimately backfire on law enforcement officers? Wouldn’t people hauled before the police refuse to answer all questions, rather than refusing to answer only certain questions? Granted, there would be more convictions initially as news of the ruling trickled through the Interwebs, but suspects would start to catch on after a few seasons of Law & Order perps parroting “Am I under arrest? Am I free to go?”
The Dish 