Russia And Ukraine, Marching As To War?

Maria Snegovaya believes Russia’s incursion into Crimea is the beginning of war:

Conflict escalation is likely to continue due to regime’s own logic and ideology, and the Kremlin’s latest actions also point in that direction. As southeastern Ukraine is destabilized by randomly emerging pro-Russia activists and mobs, the Kremlin continues concentrating large amounts of armored vehicles near Russian-Ukrainian borders, Russian authorities are preparing to seize the property of foreign citizens and institutions, and the country is threatening not to repay banking loans in economic sanctions are imposed.

Such escalation is unlikely to be peaceful. Putin lives in another world and fails to realize that Russia is far less welcome on the Ukrainian mainland than in Crimea. Southeastern Ukraine is split in between pro-Russia and pro-West Ukrainians, surveys show, and if Kremlin aggression continues into the mainland, the anti-Russian Ukrainians are likely to counteract. In other words: war.

Steven Pifer also doubts Crimea is the end of the story:

Some suggest the Ukrainian government should accept the loss of Crimea as a fact beyond its ability to reverse. It could then focus on the rest of the country, which poses plenty of political and economic challenges. Having taken Crimea, or at least pried it away from Ukraine, Russia perhaps would be content.

Moscow, however, likely will not be content as long as Ukraine desires to draw closer to the European Union—and Russia’s seizure of Crimea will only fan that desire. Kyiv will not accept the referendum or, should it come to that, Russia’s annexation of the peninsula. Doing so would not end the broader dispute with Moscow but would set a dangerous precedent that the Russians might be tempted to apply elsewhere, such as in eastern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians constitute a significant share of the population—though not a majority—and where there have been some pro-Russia demonstrations.

Andrew Kuchins calls this Putin’s “Brezhnev moment”:

No analogy is perfect, but my gut tells me that historians will regard Putin’s reckless decision to invade Crimea much like Brezhnev’s mistake in Afghanistan—as the beginning of the end. The Soviet system in 1979 had a much stronger foundation than Putin’s. The Communist Party was a very strong institution, and the leadership could trot out any number of achievements, from defeating Nazi Germany to achieving nuclear and military parity with the United States, to justify the system’s legitimacy. Most important, the communists’ tools of repression were far more powerful than those at Putin’s disposal today. Putin has failed to build any powerful institution in his 14 years in power. His principal claim to legitimacy and popular support has been the impressive economic growth Russia has enjoyed during his tenure.