by Jonah Shepp
James Surowiecki contends that when ” it comes to natural gas [Putin] isn’t thinking enough moves ahead”:
You might take Putin’s brandishing of the gas weapon as a shrewd geopolitical move. But it’s a classic case of putting short-term interests ahead of long-term gain. Although the region’s need for Gazprom supplies may strengthen his hand in the present, the strategy is forcing Europe to end its reliance on Russia.
After the crises of 2006 and 2009, Europe increased imports from Norway and Qatar. It built new facilities for receiving liquefied natural gas, and upgraded storage capacity, so that supplies could be stockpiled in case of a cutoff. It imported more coal. Pipeline connections within the E.U. were improved, making shortages easier to alleviate. The Crimea crisis will give new impetus to these efforts. The U.K.’s foreign secretary has said that the crisis is likely to make Europe “recast” its approach to energy. A draft document prepared for a forthcoming E.U. summit deplored the Continent’s “high energy dependency” and called on E.U. members to diversify their supplies. These moves are reminiscent of what happened after the oil crises of the nineteen-seventies made it clear to the West and Japan that relying on opecsuppliers was foolish. Europe installed energy-saving technologies and invested heavily in nuclear energy and natural gas. France built fifty-six nuclear reactors in the fifteen years after the oil embargo of 1973.
The Dish 