After last week’s largely ineffectual ban drew criticism and ridicule, Erdogan intensified his crackdown on the site within Turkey. Steven Cook calls the country “a case study in the reversal of political reforms, especially in the area of freedom of expression”:
The recent ban on Twitter is the logical next step in a process that has unfolded during the last few years in which the Turkish government has sought to intimidate and thereby silence critical journalists, academics and other observers. Erdogan, who is both paranoid and calculating, has sought to frame his offensive against freedom of expression as a fight against foreign plots to dishonor Turkey and undermine its recent prosperity and diplomatic influence.
Jenna Krajeski argues the ban “only serves to demonstrate how tone-deaf the A.K.P. has become in its zeal for message control”:
The move against Twitter looks desperate and, given how accessible the service remains, futile – the sort of clumsy measure that authoritarian leaders often take as they witness their power draining away. (The last time I woke up to news of Twitter being blocked was three years ago, in Cairo, when it was ordered by Hosni Mubarak.) But the ban also highlights a disturbing trend in Erdogan’s attitude toward the opposition, and signals that the authoritarian tendencies that surfaced during last year’s Gezi protests are only growing stronger.
But, writing elsewhere, Cook argues that Erdogan is playing a “shrewd and cunning” game:
Here is how it goes: He plays to his base, frames the issue as a plot among various outside and inside forces to bring Turkey to its knees, declares that he will not allow that to happen, and then emphasizes everything he and the Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.) has done for Turkey in the last eleven years. Erdogan’s message in Turkey’s profoundly polarized political environment is a way to ensure that the bulk of his base never accepts his or the A.K.P.’s culpability for anything. The fact that the prime minister is contributing to what seems to be a deep divide among Turks is all the better for Erdogan and his electoral prospects.
Aaron Stein also examines Erdogan’s political calculus:
Erdogan has championed the ballot box as the final arbiter of all that ails Turkish politics. Yet, in doing so, Erdogan is practicing majoritarian politics in an increasingly polarized political climate. Thus, as Turks prepare to vote in local elections this March, an AKP victory in key cities like Ankara and Istanbul could spark further anti-government protests. To counteract such a possibility, the government is certain to take more steps to ensure that the right to peaceful protest is further encroached upon.
And, when paired with the likely leaking of more recordings, Erdogan is sure to deem it necessary to further increase his hold over the government bureaucracy. Thus, even while Erdogan appears to have calculated that increased political polarization is the key to electoral success, it has come at a steep price for Turkish democracy.
Meanwhile, Shadi Hamid suggests Erdogan “fell victim to his own success”:
With each election, his party’s share of the vote only increased, culminating in the 2012 elections, where it received an unprecedented 49.8 percent of the vote. Winning nearly 50 percent of the vote in a parliamentary democracy is no small feat, and Erdogan interpreted it as a mandate to reshape the constitution, the political system – and ultimately the Turkish republic – in his own image and according to his nearly insatiable ambition. Now, he finds himself struggling for political survival, as opposition mounts not just in the usual quarters but among erstwhile allies and within his own party.
Previous Dish on the political situation in Turkey here, here, here, and here.
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