by Jonah Shepp
With less than a week to go before Ukraine attempts to elect a new president, Putin claims that he has ordered Russian troops to pull away from the borders—again:
The president made a similar pronouncement on May 7, which was met with the same skepticism by global leaders when NATO officials on the ground said that there appeared to be no reduction in troops. Now, also, an unnamed NATO officer told Reuters that “We haven’t seen any movement to validate (the report).” But this time, it seems that Putin may have an actual incentive to ease some pressure off of its neighbor. According to the New York Times, one candidate running for office in Kiev has caught the Kremlin’s attention, and could become something of an ally if he is voted the country’s next president. Petro Poroshenko, a wealthy pro-Western candidate who has business interests in Russia, is now a favorite to win the May 25 election.
The Dish took a look at Poroshenko last month here. Previewing the elections, Erik Herron wonders whether Kiev will be able to pull them off:
The May 11 “referendums” held in Donetsk and Luhansk further complicate the implementation of presidential elections. Polling places and election equipment (e.g., ballot boxes) were commandeered by groups conducting the vote, and some separatists have indicated that they will not permit the presidential election to take place.
Large-scale violent demonstrations in the cities of Odesa and Mariupol, as well as active combat between separatist and pro-government forces in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, threatens the security of citizens who want to participate in the polls and threats are likely to further undermine turnout. Based on data from the last presidential election, impediments to voting in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk alone could affect around 5 million voters, or 20 percent of the voting population. These regions border other large population areas, and if instability spreads, the impact on the voting-age population could be intensified.
Joshua Yaffa expects the pro-Russian separatists to attempt to sabotage the elections, but doubts they will be successful:
The separatists have enough fighters to disrupt voting and keep some polling stations from opening, especially in areas where they’re strong such as the military stronghold of Slaviansk. But they lack the numbers to take over every school, cultural center, and administrative building where voting will occur. They will probably focus on preemptive intimidation, targeting electoral officials and other local administrators for threats and attacks. In Luhansk, for example, separatist fighters kidnapped an election commissioner. Voting day may be a flashpoint for violence, because pro-Kiev paramilitary groups are expected to deploy to ensure voting while anti-Kiev fighters may fan out to do the opposite. Civilians could be the ones who suffer, as they did on May 11 during the separatist referendum, when a pro-Kiev battalion of unclear authority fired into an angry crowd in Krasnoarmeysk, killing two people.
In any event, the threat of war is being taken very seriously. In Kiev, David Patrikarakos reports that “the atmosphere has darkened”:
Maidan remains cosmetically militarised—ringed by barricades of tyres and sandbags – but it has become little more than a tourist trap, selling souvenirs of the revolution to the trickle of foreigners who still visit. Now the barricades are being reinforced and expanded. On 5 May, access into the square via a neighbouring street was controlled by a blonde militia girl of no more than 17, who manned a makeshift gate allowing vehicles access in and out. The armoured personnel carrier parked incongruously in the middle of the street—which some of the more enterprising militiamen had been charging people 50 hryvnias a turn to sit in and have their photo taken—was being cleaned and tested.
Both sides are adopting a war mentality, the most obvious—and ominous—aspect of which is the dehumanisation of the enemy. Pro-Russians describe the Odessa fire as “inhumanity … last seen by the Nazis in the Second World War,” while the more extreme pro-Ukrainian elements post memes that mock those who died. A collective psychosis, born of machismo and paranoia and fuelled by rumour, is taking hold. The latest story gaining traction in the capital is that thousands of Russians—solitary males of military age—have begun to appear in Kyiv, renting rooms and just waiting. “Let them come,” says Maksym, my wiry and intense landlord. “I’ve got body armour and I’m cleaning all my guns.”
And, in Odessa, Kirchick profiles Brighter Future for Ukraine, a recently formed civil defense group that opposes both Russian intervention and the new government:
Given the 40,000 or so Russian troops still amassed on Ukraine’s eastern border, and the active subversion efforts aimed at destabilizing the government, I ask the men why they have not joined the Ukrainian military or national guard. “There is no real chain of command in the army,” Baba tells me. They have helped the government as necessary, like when, last month, they captured, an alleged spy with a Russian passport and dozens of bank cards (purportedly for paying provocateurs). They turned him over to the Ukrainian intelligence service. But their aversion to signing up for their country’s defense forces goes beyond mere disappointment with organizational dysfunction, and strikes at the heart of why they established parallel structures to carry out what should be state functions in the first place. “So-called state leaders are not interested in the state,” Baba says.
The Dish 