Yesterday’s inauguration of India’s new prime minister Narendra Modi was marked by the surprising appearance of his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Isaac Chotiner isn’t sold on the theory that “someone like Modi, known for his nationalist views and aggressive posture, might find it easier to negotiate peace with Pakistan”:
Modi is surrounded by extreme hardliners; he has used Pakistan in the past to make alternately silly and demagogic remarks; and his constant nationalistic rhetoric is the type that often goes hand-in-hand with aggression on the world stage. As for the invitation to Sharif, it isn’t clear whether it was made because Modi genuinely wants peace and increased ties, or because he wanted to cause Sharif political difficulties. (Sharif’s decision to accept Modi’s invitation was controversial in Pakistan.) If there is another Pakistani-supported terrorist attack, such as the one on Bombay in 2008, Modi would likely respond very forcefully, as the previous government did not.
The mention of Pakistani aggression against India recalls the greatest barrier to peace, and it isn’t Modi. Pakistan’s powerful military has already halted Prime Minister Sharif’s moves toward establishing closer ties with India.
Bruce Riedel notes the challenges Sharif faces from Pakistan’s “deep state”:
Modi has pledged to seek better relations with Islamabad but only if it cracks down seriously on the deep state’s patronship of terror. He has significant potential economic carrots and sticks to use with Sharif, who knows Pakistan needs to dramatically improve trade with India if it is to get its own economy moving.
But Sharif is also very aware that the last time he was prime minister, he tried to get peace talks moving with India—only to be sabotaged by the deep state. Early in 1999 Sharif invited then-Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee to Lahore to talk about reducing tensions. Less than six months later Sharif’s army chief, Pervez Musharraf, broke the cease-fire in Kashmir and started a small war around the town of Kargil. The small war threatened to escalate into a full-scale catastrophe with nuclear weapons until Sharif bravely came to Washington on July 4th and was persuaded by President Bill Clinton to unilaterally pull back the Pakistani army behind the cease-fire line. By the end of 1999 Sharif had been overthrown in a coup by Musharraf. The deep state had triumphed.
Pointing to an attack on the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan, last Friday, Paul Staniland weighs Modi’s “limited” options for dealing with Pakistani terrorism:
Modi can try to reach out to Pakistani civilian leaders in hopes of splitting them from a skeptical military, but this has been India’s strategy in the past with little success. “Spoilers” like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba have repeatedly undermined India-Pakistan rapprochement. Pakistan’s powerful army seems to be in no mood for a deal with New Delhi, viewing India as a rising power now run by a Hindu chauvinist, and regularly alleging that India is supporting militant groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Simmering civil-military tensions over media freedom and policy toward the TTP have limited Sharif’s ability to deliver on policy change.
India cannot credibly threaten military retaliation. As Vipin Narang has shown, Pakistan’s mixture of conventional and nuclear forces is intended to rapidly escalate any conflict, making Indian ground or even air strikes extremely risky. … In the face of these constraints, we are likely to see a two-pronged Indian strategy. First, outreach to Pakistan’s civilians will continue. Modi has a commanding majority and hard-liner credibility that limit his vulnerability to domestic criticism. Sharif is believed to be interested in improving ties with India, and there is always a chance that he and Modi can craft some forward progress. Second, India is likely to expand its overseas intelligence operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Dish 