Month: June 2014

Beijing is on lockdown as tomorrow’s 25th anniversary of Tiananmen Square approaches:

Government control and interference is evident every year around the anniversary. China has referred to June 4 as “Internet maintenance day,” taking so many sites down for “fixes” that it is unclear which sites are being targeted with restrictions, reports The Washington Post. But this year, the crackdown has reached new levels.

Amnesty International reports arrests and detentions have been on the rise. Scores of activists, lawyers, students, academics, and relatives of those killed in 1989 have been detained, put under house arrest, or questioned, reports Time. Security around the public square has been so strict that tourists have had security officials bar them from the grounds, reports Time. Google services – including Gmail and translation services ­– have been interrupted since late last week, reports Bloomberg.

Lily Kuo remarks on how successfully the Chinese government has erased the events of June 4, 1989 from the collective memory:

[C]ontrary to what some activists might have hoped, the state-mandated erasure of the incident has been extremely effective. Only 15 out of 100 university students in Beijing recognize the iconic picture of “Tank Man” a demonstrator blocking the path of a line of tanks, according to The People’s Republic of Amnesia, a new book on the topic by NPR correspondent Louisa Lim. …

Scouring the Chinese internet for references to June 4 has become an annual event for the government’s censors, but this year’s efforts have gone further than ever before. All Google services in China, including gmail, are now being blocked on the mainland. … As in previous years, even circuitous mentions of June 4 on social media—including the Chinese characters for six and four together, for the date of June 4, the search term “four, open fire” or “25 years“— are being swiftly deleted by censors. China’s version of Wikipedia, Baike, has no entry for the entire year of 1989.

An anonymous Tea Leaf Nation contributor explains why the Internet has not made it any easier for Chinese youth to talk about the crackdown:

The immense interest among those jiulinghou [Chinese children of the 90s] who are in the know has not translated into active discussion, let alone action. Not all of us think it was wrong to use force against the protesters. And we certainly do not all think China should adopt Western-style democracy. But whatever our views are, we dare not openly discuss them online, in public forums, or even in private chats. And since the Internet is where my generation goes to communicate, we are essentially deprived of the chance to engage in civil discourse.

The Internet has chilled an honest reckoning with Tiananmen, not enabled it. While the web has given rise to a level of pluralism China has never seen before, and minted new, grassroots opinion leaders, it has also made everything we write, both in public and in private, more easily surveilled. Before the digital era, officials didn’t have the ability to eavesdrop on every conversation. But now, if I post something politically sensitive online, the conversation is digitally recorded. Everything becomes part of our permanent record.

But Ellen Bork suggests that “China’s communist leaders may find their efforts to suppress memory backfire”:

According to Min Xin Pei, a scholar of totalitarian transitions at Claremont McKenna College, half of China’s population was born after 1976. They don’t remember the chaotic and violent Cultural Revolution in which millions were sent to perform manual labor in the countryside, as marauding Red Guards sowed paranoia among family and friends. Might this contribute to a change of rule one day? “The basis of rule of all authoritarian regimes is one simple fact—fear,” Pei told an audience at the National Endowment for Democracy. “A psychological shift can come very very quickly.” What that shift will bring, no one can say for sure. But the world will have had at least 25 years to prepare for it.

Meanwhile, Heather Timmons contrasts the mainland’s information blackout with the scene in Hong Kong, where the event is well remembered:

Hong Kong is gearing up for its annual candlelight vigil to mark the anniversary, which is expected to attract more than 150,000 people. Local universities are sponsoring exhibitions and talks by witnesses and journalists (including the “Tank Guy” photographer). The Foreign Correspondents Club is screening a documentary featuring interviews with witnesses and journalists who covered the protests.

On a more personal scale, hundreds of groups of Hong Kong families and friends are expected to gather in their homes on the evening of June 4 to commemorate the event. That will include many people from mainland China, tens of thousands of whom have obtained Hong Kong residency since 1989. At the candlelight event, “in recent years we have noticed more people from mainland China,” said Richard Tsoi, the vice-chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China.

There are no plans to free Meriam Ibrahim. Info, sign petition here: http://t.co/598yDxncvE #Pray #ForMeriam pic.twitter.com/iQeyVp00Qs

— Eric Jonas Swensson (@KinderEric) June 3, 2014

A PhD candidate in Islamic studies lends his expertise:

Finally, a topic I can write to you about without talking completely out of my ass! In a recent post, you quote a Foreign Policy article to the effect that the Sudanese regime’s decision to execute Mariam Ibrahim for apostasy is “a calculated and direct threat to the role the United States has been playing in the world,” and that it is lashing out now because it is “bitter at the United States’ role in the loss of what is now South Sudan.”

Bullshit. As a left-wing academic steeped in postmodern gobbledygook, nothing would please me more than to blame America for the Bashir regime’s behavior. The reality is that the regime is doing what it is doing for reasons entirely internal to Sudan and that have absolutely nothing to do with the US, the international community, or even South Sudan (the creation of which, I would add, owes relatively little to American efforts – that prize goes to regional negotiators like IGAD).

Over the last decade, the fragile coalition of Islamists, military leaders, and businessmen that rule Sudan has been coming apart at the seams. In early 2012, it nearly collapsed all together when some of the most respected Islamists in the governing National Congress Party wrote a scathing letter to Bashir, accusing him of corruption, incompetence, and betraying the Islamic cause. Since then, Bashir has been desperate to prove his religious bona fides to the younger generation of Islamists on which he has increasingly come to rely (see here for a terrific analysis). That means, among other things, sanctioning outrageous judicial decisions like this one.

I’d also add that it seems unlikely the government will actually follow through on Mariam Ibrahim’s death sentence. It feels inappropriate to make predictions about something so horrible, but people need to understand that this isn’t the first time the regime has done this sort of thing, only to backdown at the last moment. In fact, since the apostasy law first went on the books in Sudan in 1991, not a single person convicted under it has been executed. To this day, the only person in Sudan to be executed for apostasy was the famous reformer Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, but he was hanged before Bashir came to power and for reasons that had nothing to do with apostasy.

Sorry for going on at such length, but you’re finally talking about something I actually know something about and I’m desperate to show off.

It’s what Dish readers do best.

A reader can relate:

I liked your post on Playing the Whore and would like to share some insight into Seattle’s Kink community, of which I am a member. The first thing that struck me about the community is how safe it feels. The guiding principle is that anyone can give or take away consent at any time without judgement. This is not something you can expect in the outside world, but it is non-negotiable in here. It’s this level of security that has given me the confidence to explore situations I would not otherwise attempt and has allowed me to derive pleasure in ways I never expected.

I know some people get off on the perv-factor, but nothing I’ve witnessed or engaged in has felt perverted or deviant to me, and I think the open, non-judgmental atmosphere is what enables the seeming normality of it all.

Another factor, to my mind, is that we’re all just regular people; we’re the gal you see on the bus or that guy who works at your bank. You see kinky people everyday going about their normal lives, I get to see them do much more than that and it makes me feel special.

There is something I engage in, however, that I think would be very difficult for outsiders to understand, and that’s okay because I don’t think I would have understood it myself if not for the opportunity to try it in a safe place with people I trust. I like to engage in impact play, on both sides, which results in bruises, wounds and all manner of battle scars. I take great pride in my marks and often photograph them to share, as many others do. I know that my photos can sometimes make it appear as though I were a victim of a violent crime or domestic abuse. I don’t have fantasies about being abused or beaten.

The thing that surprised me most the first time I tried it was that the process is not humiliating or degrading in any way. On the contrary, it can actually be very beautiful. Perhaps it’s because I tried it first as a top and found that I can fulfill this request from another with tenderness and completely without malice resulting in something both intimate and sublime. I guess if I tried to explain it to someone that would be it, the difference is matter of hitting someone out of anger/desire to control vs. hitting someone out of love/desire to please. Different worlds, similar results.

Thanks for shining your spotlight on this world and keep up the good work!

Gary Samore checks in on negotiations with Iran:

[Khamenei] sees a nuclear deal as a way to relieve the immediate threat of economic sanctions, but not as an opening to improve overall U.S.-Iranian relations, much less a strategic decision to abandon Iran’s longstanding nuclear weapons program. Other Iranians, of course, have different hopes. Some Iranians whisper that the United States should be lenient on nuclear terms to help President Rouhani achieve a victory so that he can defeat hardliner factions in the November 2015 legislative elections and ultimately shift Iranian foreign policy in a more moderate direction. Even if true—and it might be—President Obama cannot sell a nuclear deal on the basis of secret promises from closet reformers. He needs to be able to demonstrate real, long-term constraints on Iran’s ability to produce fissile material, and so far there’s no sign President Rouhani can deliver, even if he wanted to. If a deal is to be had, the supreme leader will have to be convinced to sacrifice his nuclear achievements to save the economy.

Michael Young considers Iran’s role in the Arab world:

In some countries where it sees the possibility of controlling the commanding heights of decision-making, the Islamic Republic will perpetuate dynamics of unity. Lebanon is a good example.

However, in countries where political, sectarian and ethnic divisions make this impossible, Iran will exacerbate fragmentation. In that way, it can control chunks of a country, usually the center, while enhancing the marginalization and debilitation of areas not under its authority. Iraq and Syria are good illustrations of this version of creative chaos.

Whether the Iranian approach has been an effective one is a different question altogether. Certainly, it has given Tehran considerable latitude to be a regional player and obstruct outcomes that might harm its interests. But there is also fundamental instability in a strategy based on exploiting conflict and volatility, denying Iran the permanence it has historically achieved through its creation of lasting institutions.

Elliot Abrams adds:

[I]n the Arab world, the critical Iran issue is not its nuclear program but Iran’s aggression, subversion, and interference in Arab countries’ politics. And the fear is widespread in the Arab world that any U.S.-Iran nuclear deal will only give Iran greater resources (when sanctions are lifted) and more freedom of maneuver. Nothing President Obama said in his West Point speech [last] week will diminish that fear; in fact, the President’s words will likely increase the sense in the Arab world that his interest in an Iran nuclear agreement may lead to a bad deal and to acceptance of other Iranian misconduct as part of the price for an agreement.

Yesterday, SCOTUS ruled that the federal government cannot use a law implementing an international chemical weapons treaty to prosecute a private citizen. Garrett Epps describes what the court called “this curious case”:

This is the second installment of the soap opera of Carol Anne Bond. Bond’s husband and her best friend conceived a child. When she found out, Bond, a trained laboratory technician, turned to the hostile use of 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine and potassium dichromate, both deadly poisons. She smeared them on various doorknobs and car doors at Hayes’s house, on one occasion giving Hayes’s thumb a nasty burn. She also unwisely smeared them on Hayes’s mailbox, which is by law part of the U.S. Postal System. Postal inspectors posted security cameras and caught her on video. Federal prosecutors proclaimed this “a very serious, scary case,” because Bond had stolen four pounds of potassium dichromate from her workplace. They charged her with theft of the mail—and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229, the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998.

On Monday a six-justice majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, told the government it had misread the statute to “sweep in everything from the detergent under the kitchen sink to the stain remover in the laundry room,” and “make[] it a federal offense to poison goldfish.” Roberts was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. All nine justices agreed that the government had gone too far in prosecuting Bond. The majority said the indictment violated the statute; Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito would have held the prosecution unconstitutional.

Amy Howe explains how the justices split on the constitutional question:

 

Because the Court held that the federal ban on chemical weapons does not apply to Bond, it left for another day whether Congress – relying on its constitutional power to approve treaties – can also pass laws to put a treaty into effect in the U.S., even if no other provision of the Constitution would have given it the authority to do so.  (The Court will often refrain from deciding a question involving the Constitution if it can decide the case on some other, non-constitutional ground – a principle known as “constitutional avoidance.”)

But Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all would have weighed in on that question, because in their view it was “clear beyond doubt” that the federal chemical weapons law applied to Bond.  They would have struck down her conviction for another reason:  that the mere fact that the Constitution authorizes Congress to approve treaties does not automatically mean that laws passed to put the treaties into effect are constitutional.  And here, in their view, the federal ban on chemical weapons is not.

Noting that “the court was unwilling simply to say that it was interpreting the law flexibly to avoid an absurd result,” Noah Feldman worries that the ruling, though narrower than Scalia, et al. would have liked, will still have broader consequences than it ought to:

See, Congress’s power to pass the chemical weapons law derived from its authority to pass laws implementing treaties. Everyone agrees such authority exists, even though it isn’t expressly stated in the Constitution. But not everyone agrees on whether Congress can use this power to pass laws that might trench on states’ rights. And arguably, the authority to regulate ordinary assaults is within the states’ exclusive power. Drawing on all this, the court, in a 9-0 decision, announced that the law must be found ambiguous in what it called “this curious case” because read literally the statute would be improbably broad, even “boundless,” and would potentially impinge state prerogatives. It held that it would have needed a “clear indication” that Congress intended to apply the law to this conduct — and indication the court found lacking.

If this sounds fine, it isn’t. Despite the court’s apparent preference to cabin its holding to these strange facts, the decision will probably be read to limit Congress’ ability to legislate based on its power to implement treaties. In the future, it can be argued that a given statute shouldn’t be applied because Congress hasn’t been “utterly clear” that it does. This may not bother the states’ rights justices, but it should bother anyone who cares about the U.S. fulfilling its international treaty obligations.

Posner reads Scalia’s opinion as a strategic move meant to head off a very particular threat:

The unstated target of the opinion is the international human rights treaty. Those treaties ban all kinds of police-powers-related stuff. The Senate ensured that they were not self-executing, but I suppose that the next time Democrats control the government, they could pass laws that implement them. At least in theory, a Democratic sweep could result in ratification of a human rights treaty that bans the death penalty, and then implementation of it through a federal statute. Not likely to happen anytime in the next few decades if ever, but you can’t fault Scalia for failing to think ahead.