Putting Off The Iran Deal

Over the weekend, negotiations with Iran were given a four-month extension. The state of play:

The six powers want Iran to dramatically reduce its nuclear programme for a lengthy period of time and agree to more intrusive UN inspections. This would expand the time needed for Tehran to develop a nuclear weapon, while giving the world ample warning of any such “breakout” push.

The two sides are believed to have narrowed their positions in recent weeks on a few issues such as the Arak reactor, which could give Iran weapons-grade plutonium, and enhanced inspections. But they remain far apart on the key issue of Iran’s capacities to enrich uranium, a process which can produce fuel for reactors but also the core of a nuclear bomb.

The administration is trying to stay upbeat:

Obama administration officials insist that the talks have made major progress that justified giving negotiators until November to pursue a final deal. In a statement, Secretary of State John Kerry said“the very real prospect of reaching a good agreement that achieves our objectives necessitates that we seek more time.”

The Senate, however, remains a wild card – and AIPAC has been doing its usual work to buttress the case for war and for scuttling any agreement. The problem there, it seems to me, is that the necessarily private diplomacy has not allowed for a more robust and public discussion as to the costs and benefits. My own view is that the American public could be persuaded of the sanity of the least-worst option when it comes to preventing Iran getting a nuclear bomb; but the administration has been timid and defensive in its public outreach. Maybe that would change after a possible agreement. But it may be too late by then.

Majid Rafizadeh believes, for his part, that “the gaps between the six world powers and Iran would more likely require more than four months of extensions as well as a significant shift in Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s stance on his government’s nuclear program, or a remarkable change in the six world power’s stance”:

Considering the intricacies and examining Iran’s nuclear file and Tehran’s defiance, it becomes evident that the four month extension of diplomatic negotiations is barely enough to resolve these major hurdles.

The major barriers between the P5+1 (mainly the Western members: France, United Kingdom, Germany and the United States) and the Islamic Republic come down to the restriction of Iran’s production of plutonium, the dismantlement of crucial segments of the uranium enrichment program, the limiting of stockpiling and production, the question of Fordow, its underground nuclear facility center, the extent as to how the Islamic Republic should provide data with regards to its development, what type of nuclear research can be carried out, and how many centrifuges Iran can retain.

Tamara Wittes heard from Israelis that they are “worried that an extension would give the Iranians more time to exploit differences within the P5+1 and erode the sanctions regime.” But:

[I]t’s still important to evaluate this four-month extension in light of the alternatives. A collapse of the talks driven by U.S. dissatisfaction would have been even more likely to split the P5+1, and more likely to lead key states to soften their sanctions commitments. At the same time, the end of the interim deal would have left Iran’s enrichment and other nuclear activities unconstrained and largely unmonitored. It would have led, therefore, to a rapid collapse of the existing international pressure/containment strategy and a rapid escalation in the threat posed by Iran — and thus a push toward military force.

Meanwhile, Josh Rogin fears Russia will play spoiler:

[If] Putin decides that retaliating against the U.S. and ruining Obama’s foreign policy legacy is more important than sealing a pact with Iran, the whole thing could unravel. The shooting down of MH17 has escalated the diplomatic war between Washington and Moscow and made that scenario more likely because it could result in more sanctions and legal action against the Russian government.

It’s a Rubik’s cube. The odds are long.