by Dish Staff
Christopher Dickey isn’t impressed with the president’s response to the Russian invasion, which he still won’t call an “invasion”:
Obama knows invasion is a “fightin’ word,” as they used to say in old Hollywood Westerns. And he knows — and we all know — a shootout in the Ukraine corral against the world’s other great nuclear power would be beyond foolish. But under the circumstances, even such a stalwart of administration policymaking as Ivo Daalder has run out of patience with the vague language coming out of Foggy Bottom and the White House. Daalder doesn’t recommend military action, certainly, but he does recommend NATO members step up their defense spending and deploy their vast military resources throughout the alliance in a way that makes the threat of force more credible. After all, Putin has shown his imperial appetite knows no bounds, and the tactics he’s used to shave off portions of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine could be turned on the NATO-member Baltics. Daalder also calls on Western countries to supply advance weapons and a steady stream of intelligence to Kiev. And finally the U.S. and the E.U. need to impose full-scale economic sanctions on Moscow.
Noah Rothman faults Obama for tying his own hands diplomatically by revealing too much:
One never takes a tool off the table during a negotiation without reciprocity from the negotiating partner. To do otherwise is to set a bad precedent, one which a smart negotiating partner will make you repeat. President Obama insisted that the sanctions regime he has imposed on Russia is working, that he will not approve a military solution to the crisis in Ukraine, and that providing lethal aid to Kiev’s forces is not under immediate consideration. What, then, is on the table? Our options are increasingly limited while Moscow’s freedom to escalate or de-escalate as he sees fit remains robust.
Steven Pifer recommends an assertive response, including more sanctions and military aid to beef up the Ukrainian army:
First, the West should adopt additional economic sanctions on Russia. Those applied to date have had an impact, as evidenced by increasing capital flight, a rising inflation rate and an economy that teeters on the verge of recession. The prospect of additional economic pain will cause greater unease in Moscow and could press Putin to reconsider his course. Second, the United States and Europe should provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance, such as light anti-armor weapons and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. The West cannot give Ukraine enough to defeat the far stronger Russian army, but it can enable the Ukrainian military to drive up the cost of aggression. The Kremlin has tried to cover up reports of Russian casualties in Ukraine. Although the Russian people have supported Putin’s policy toward Ukraine, polls show that an overwhelming majority do not want the Russian army there. That could be significant, especially if the number of Russian casualties grows, which could well erode the political support that Putin enjoys. That might push him to change his calculus.
But Marc Champion is not so sure that arming Ukraine is a good idea:
The U.S. and Europe have made it clear that they will not go to war with Russia — a nuclear superpower — to defend Ukraine’s borders. That may not be fair, but it is rational. And no matter how many weapons the U.S. and European allies supply to Ukraine, Russia will deploy more of them, wielded by better trained troops. The logical progression of a NATO armament program for Ukraine is broader conflict. Putin would proceed, knowing that, in the end, Ukraine’s allies would not have its back. The calculation could change if Putin decides to push his military deeper into Ukraine — realizing fears of a wider conflict while heightening the security concerns of nearby Poland. For now, however, a formal arms program seems unwise.
NATO, meanwhile, isn’t exactly speaking with one voice here:
All NATO members oppose Russia’s destabilizing role in Ukraine. But they don’t place the same priority on stopping it, nor have they agreed on a strategy to address it. The annexation of Crimea has sent tremors through the Baltics, and rightly so: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are all home to sizable ethnic Russian minorities. Eastern European leaders have called on NATO for assistance, but the allied response has been mixed. Before arriving in Wales, President Obama will visit Estonia to “reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe” and “reaffirm our ironclad commitment to [Article 5] as the foundation of NATO.” Meanwhile, Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that NATO would begin building up its military presence along its eastern borders. But Germany, Italy, Spain, and France—far less vulnerable than the Baltics—are reluctant to further antagonize Moscow.
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