Noah Feldman previews the upcoming legislative elections, the country’s first since ratifying its new constitution in January. The main contenders are the ruling Ennahda party, which espouses a moderate form of political Islam, and Nidaa Tounes, a secular party whose main appeal to many voters “is that it isn’t Ennahda”:
What will happen Sunday? Polls are relatively unreliable, but in general they have the two parties running close with Nidaa perhaps somewhat ahead. For Ennahda, the best result would be to win a plurality, then form a governing coalition with Nidaa or smaller secularist parties. … If Ennahda does win a plurality, expect the party to keep its promise of not running a presidential candidate. Ennahda knows that with a legislative plurality and the president from his own party, it would be too powerful and might well provoke a response.
If Nidaa wins a plurality, however, the situation will become more complicated.
Nidaa might well believe that it could form a coalition without Ennahda. Nidaa would have significant momentum to win the presidential contest — at which point [Nidaa leader Beji Caid] Essebsi would find himself an 88-year-old with a serious secular mandate. The temptation to use undemocratic means and get rid of Ennahda as a viable political force could be hard to resist. The result would be a disaster for Tunisia’s hopes of becoming a functioning democracy.
While the country has made great strides in democratization, the Arab Spring’s only genuine success story isn’t without its blemishes, David Kirkpatrick reports, at least not when it comes to combating radicalism:
[I]nstead of sapping the appeal of militant extremism, the new freedom that came with the Arab Spring revolt has allowed militants to preach and recruit more openly than ever before. At the same time, many young Tunisians say that the new freedoms and elections have done little to improve their daily lives, create jobs or rein in a brutal police force that many here still refer to as “the ruler,” or, among ultraconservative Islamists, “the tyrant.” Although Tunisia’s steps toward democracy have enabled young people to express their dissident views, impatience and skepticism have evidently led a disgruntled minority to embrace the Islamic State’s radically theocratic alternative. Tunisian officials say that at least 2,400 Tunisians have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the group — other studies say as many as 3,000 — while thousands more have been blocked in the attempt.
Walter Russell Mead isn’t surprised by that:
For the most part, the Western media met the Arab Spring with unbridled enthusiasm, envisioning a sudden joining of the path to development, democracy, and peace that much of the world has been on since 1991, or sooner. But whether in 17th century England or late 19th-early 20th century Eastern Europe, the path to prosperity and modernity has been anything but smooth and easy, and democracy and religious extremism have often gone hand in hand. Contrary to the facile understanding of the world which seemed to undergird a lot of the reporting on the Arab Spring, not all violence is the result of misunderstandings, repression, or poverty, not all poverty is the result of just having the ‘wrong’ political system in place, and sometimes, especially for religious reasons, people really and earnestly want to kill each other.
Dalibor Rohac connects extremism in Tunisia to the country’s economy:
The political violence may have multiple roots, but Tunisia’s poor economic performance is clearly one of them. In recent years, many strikes and protests over economic conditions have taken a violent turn and led to attacks on local police stations, for example. …
Because of a vibrant tourism sector and economic links with Europe, Tunisia has relied less on government ownership and industrial planning than other Arab countries and has long enjoyed the presence of many foreign investors. Still, its economy faces significant barriers to competition and market activity. Tunisia ranks 87th on the most recent World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, compared to 32nd in the 2010–2011 edition. Its poor performance is driven mainly by its underdeveloped goods, financial, and labor markets, which are paralyzed by heavy-handed regulation.
Lastly, back to the election, Asma Ghribi is concerned that many Tunisian voters won’t turn out Sunday:
Despite voter registration campaigns and efforts by the High Electoral Commission, known by its French acronym ISIE, voter registration has been relatively low. Samira Marai, a former member of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), the elected legislative body that drafted Tunisia’s constitution, said people have lost faith and confidence in politicians.
“I get people telling me all political parties are only eager to serve their own interests and not their constituents,” added Marai, who is affiliated with the secular Afek Tounes party. “There is a crisis of trust.” According to her, a major reason for the sense of disillusionment among many Tunisans is the failure of progressive parties to unite, leaving the secular political camp fragmented and chaotic. “We [secular parties] should have come together under the leadership of one party. We could have done it. But the problem in Tunisia is that every political party thinks it is strong enough to win enough votes.”
She’s probably right.
The Dish 