A Caveat On The NIE

A reader writes:

As a Republican, it is good to wake up and see Condi Rice and Robert Gates vindicated, especially Condi. She has been vilified by the Go To War Crowd at the NRO and the American Spectator for at least the past two years. Now, her path appears to have been the wisest choice.

However, bear something in mind. The data for the NIE comes from CIA Assessments, among other things. It would be interesting to hear what the Mossad and IDF Aman Intelligence has to say.

Why, you ask? CIA won’t tell you this, but we have NOTHING in Iran. Our assets were rolled up years ago by the Revolutionary Guards. What is the factual basis for the reporting that went into the NIE? Is it any more valid than the stuff that animated the war scare and made Dick Cheney walk the Earth by Night?

In other words, as you breath a sigh of relief, how much of this report is politically motivated by a CIA eager to head off a war with Iran, and how much of it is based on actual intelligence? My skepticism arises from the decades of risible incompetence displayed by that agency across decades and Continents. These were the guys who gave us the Mossadegh Coup, the Missile Gap, and Curveball, remember?

Or, as another reader notes more succinctly:

PHEW. The CIA say Iran’s not building a bomb. They’re just enriching uranium. I feel SO much better.

Parser-In-Chief

A key recent exchange:

Q But you definitively believe Iran wants to build a nuclear weapon?

THE PRESIDENT: I think so long — until they suspend and/or make it clear that they — that their statements aren’t real, yeah, I believe they want to have the capacity, the knowledge, in order to make a nuclear weapon. […]

So I’ve told people that if you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. I take the threat of Iran with a nuclear weapon very seriously.

They "want to have the capacity, the knowledge, in order to make." Makes more sense now, doesn’t it?

The NIE vs VDH

Here’s WaPo’s assessment of the NIE’s view of what caused the Iranians to go slow:

Intelligence officials credited increased international scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program and the threat of exposure of its previously undisclosed uranium enrichment efforts with influencing Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons effort.

Senior intelligence officials said it is possible that Libya’s decision to halt its nuclear program and the war in Iraq were also factors, but said there was no direct evidence of either.

Think of this as the CIA’s professionals refighting the Iraq war against the vice-president – and winning this time.

Neoconservatism and Iran

A reader writes:

The fundamental premise of the neocon argument for attacking Iran is based on two concepts:

1. A nuclear armed Iran, even with a single weapon and little means to deliver it, is a fundamental threat to our nation that cannot be permitted

2. A military strike against Iran will stop them from being able to make a nuclear weapon.

I will grant that, assuming such a strike did in fact wipe out all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, on the day after that attack, Iran would find themselves unable to make a nuclear weapon.  What happens on day two?  Day 10?  Day 1000?  Would Iran be progressing towards liberal democracy?  No.  Would Iran have less motivation to possess a nuclear weapon?  No.  Quite the opposite, they’d have indisputable evidence that they were vulnerable and that having a nuclear trump card was vital to their security.

In a neocon world, time stops after we attack. Unfortunately for all of us, they are living in our world, not theirs.

And what if Putin or a future Pakistani leader decides just to give them one anyway, in solidarity after US aggression? I understand the worry about Iran’s regime and nukes. It’s real. But pretending that no other global powers exist or that mere bombing will solve our fundamental problem with Islamism seems to me to be badly short-sighted.

The Evil In Tehran

They persecute non-Muslims with the intensity they persecute all dissidents. Here’s an excellent piece by Paul Marshall in the Weekly Standard:

[The 1991 document] …outlined a plan gradually to choke the Baha’i community. They were not usually to be subject to further arrests or deportations from the country: Henceforth the government was to ensure that "their progress and development are blocked." They could be enrolled in schools but only if they "have not identified themselves as Baha’is." They were to be expelled from universities altogether. They could have jobs only on condition that they not "identify themselves as Baha’is," and, if employed, must have only "a modest livelihood" and be denied "any position of influence." Khamenei added a handwritten note to the directive expressing his approval, thus conferring on it the status of an official decree. (These and other documents have been made available by the Baha’i community–see news.bahai.org.)

The regime continued to persecute the Baha’is, as well as other religious minorities, and parts of this plan were carried out–including their exclusion from universities and many jobs. But now the government’s program has entered a more intensive and systematic phase. An October 29, 2005, confidential letter sent on Khamenei’s instructions by Major General Hossein Firuzabadi, chairman of the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces, ordered the Ministry of Information, the Revolutionary Guard, and the Police Force to "acquire a comprehensive and complete report" to identify all Baha’is.

(Hat tip: Norm.)

No Good Military Options Against Iran

This Stratfor analysis by George Friedman struck me as dispositive. It raises the possibility of every single kind of military attack on Iran – from air-strikes to attempt to degrade its nuclear capacity, to blockades, ground invasion, and bids to use military force to drive a wedge between the Persian population and the Islamo-fascist regime. Stratfor is hardly a peacenik outfit, and it concludes that almost all the options are extremely complicated and probably counter-productive. Here’s the nuclear analysis:

First, the available evidence is that Iran is years away from achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon. Second, Iran might be more interested in trading its nuclear program for other political benefits — specifically in Iraq. An attack against the country’s nuclear facilities would make Tehran less motivated than before to change its behavior. Furthermore, even if its facilities were destroyed, Iran would retain its capabilities in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere in the world. Therefore, unless the United States believed there was an imminent threat of the creation of a deliverable nuclear system, the destruction of a long-term program would eliminate the long-term threat, but leave Iran’s short-term capabilities intact. Barring imminent deployment, a stand-alone attack against Iran’s nuclear capabilities makes little sense.

Friedman is not a great deal more optimistic about any other goal and the means to achieve it. I’m not a military expert, so I welcome any critiques of the piece. But it is pretty persuasive to me that we have very few effective military options against Iran, and the ramifications of an attack could be dire.

Stoning And Executing A 13-Year-Old

An insight into the mentality that rules Iran:

Child offender Makwan Moloudzadeh, an Iranian Kurd, is believed to be at risk of imminent execution. He has reportedly been convicted of anal sex for the alleged rape of a 13-year-old boy. Makwan Moloudzadeh was aged 13 at the time of the alleged offence. His death sentence has been passed to the Office for the Implementation of Sentences and he is due to be executed in public, near his home.

…The witnesses and the two people who had pressed charges against him withdrew their claims after the trial. Under Iranian law, children (boys of up to 14.7 years) are to be flogged for homosexual acts.

However, the judge relied on the “knowledge of the judge” to determine that penetration had taken place and that Makwan Moloudzadeh could be sentenced to death.

… During his trial, Makwan Moloudzadeh reportedly maintained his innocence. … He is reported to have gone on hunger strike for 10 days to protest against his ill-treatment in detention. Prior to his trial and conviction, on or around 7 October 2006 Makwan Moloudzadeh was reportedly paraded through the streets of Paveh riding on a donkey, with his head shaved. People in the street shouted abuse and threw things at him.